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
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IN THIS ISSUE

THE isolation by new chemical methods of specific fractions of human blood recently opened the way to experimental use of concentrated amounts of single constituents as prophylactic and therapeutic agents. Significant advances have resulted in the treatment of many conditions through the use of the proper, specific blood element as, for example, the treatment of shock with albumin and anemia with red blood cells. The fraction known as gamma globulin contains the immune bodies present in normal human serum and it is proving to be an effective agent in the control of some communicable diseases, especially measles. The results of the experimental use of gamma globulin are discussed by Dr. William Berenberg in the article entitled "Gamma Globulin as a Prophylactic and Therapeutic Agent in Communicable Disease."

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The January *Quarterly* carried two of the eleven papers presented at the Round Table on Postwar Problems of Migration, held in connection with the Fund's 1946 Annual Conference. Six appear in this issue and the remaining three will be published later. Eventually, reprints of the total series will be available in the form of bound volumes.

The first two papers in this issue complete the section on world aspects of migration. The next three are devoted to immigration problems of this country and the final one is concerned with internal migration within this country. In the first paper, "European Migrations: Prewar Trends and Future Prospects," Dr. Dudley Kirk explains why the Europe that contributed so heavily to the peopling of the new world is now witnessing a "fading and gradual disappearance" of overseas

migration. He discusses the trends and possibilities of international migration within Europe and summarizes results from recent opinion polls on migration conducted in various countries of the world.

In his paper "Possibilities and Limits of International Control of Migration," Dr. Carter Goodrich emphasizes that we are still too far from a "one world" to have either free and unrestricted migration between nations, or any comprehensive regulation of migration by an international body. He believes, nevertheless, that much room is left for international cooperation in the guidance of migration. As evidence of actual developments in this direction he cites the bilateral and multilateral agreements on migration that were in force between European countries during and between the wars and between the United States and Mexico during the last war. The program of the I.L.O.'s Permanent Migration Committee and that of the Population Commission of the United Nations presuppose a faith in the expanding possibilities of international action in the field of migration.


By way of introduction to problems of immigration in this country, Dr. E. P. Hutchinson provides a valuable factual account entitled "The Present Status of Our Immigration Laws and Policies." He traces briefly the history of federal immigration legislation since the original act of 1882. He gives particular attention to the provisions of the 1917 and 1924 acts, since these, despite subsequent acts and amendments, still constitute our basic immigration law. This paper provides a convenient listing of excludable classes of immigrant aliens, classes of aliens deportable after entry, and classes of persons admissible as quota and nonquota immigrants.

Dr. Warren S. Thompson presents the next paper, "Demographic and Economic Implications of Larger Immigration." The demographic implications are discussed within the context of given assumptions regarding the number and type of immigrants to this country within the next twenty-five years. The economic implications are described as much more complex, and hence subject to widely varying interpretations. Without presuming to give the answers, the author sets forth his views on the relation of large immigration to wage levels, the develop-

ment of labor organizations, the rate of industrial expansion, and the attainment of the economic optimum of population.

Dr. Maurice R. Davie in his paper "Recent Refugee Immigration From Europe," summarizes the chief findings from a recent survey which he directed for the Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe. Through the cooperation of over 200 agencies and committees interested in foreign-born groups, a large amount of data was collected, including questionnaires filled out by over 11,000 refugees in 638 communities of 44 states and the District of Columbia, special data from refugee physicians, dentists and business men, life stories, and interview materials. After a general description of the number, distribution, and demographic characteristics of all refugees in this country, Dr. Davie uses the survey materials for a discussion of the economic, social, and cultural adjustment of the group.

Dr. Conrad Taeuber's paper "Recent Trends of Rural-Urban Migration in the United States," introduces the section on internal migration in this country. Owing to the wartime demand for industrial workers and soldiers, the farm population decreased by over five million during 1940-1944, despite the high birth rates of farm people. This heavy loss was superimposed on lighter but persistent declines that had been in operation since 1933. This downward trend was reversed during 1945 and 1946 owing to a return of soldiers to farms and to a stoppage of net loss from rural-urban migration. Dr. Taeuber examines several factors affecting size of farm population and discusses the outlook for the future.



GAMMA GLOBULIN AS A PROPHYLACTIC AND THERAPEUTIC AGENT IN COMMUNICABLE DISEASE*

WILLIAM BERENBERG, M.D.¹

A. PLASMA FRACTIONATION

TRANSFUSION of whole blood has long been employed for numerous conditions, such as hemorrhage, anemia, debility, infection, hypoproteinemia, thrombocytopenia, and hemophilia. Blood is a complex mixture of multiple elements with different properties and physiological activities. The desired clinical effect of its transfusion usually depends on the physiological function of a single component. Actually in only one situation, hemorrhage, are all the constituents of blood required to repair the physiologic defect. In most other instances, it would be more rational to employ only that component of blood whose physiological function was desired. Methods for the fractionation of plasma (1) (2) have evolved which permit the chemical isolation of several of its known constituents in a form suitable for clinical use. Thus it not only is more rational to employ these preparations to obtain the desired effect, but it allows the clinician to use larger amounts of the active fraction in order to achieve a more rapid and effective result. It also is obviously more economical to use only the desired fraction and not whole blood, thus leaving the various other fractions to be employed in other patients where their use is specifically indicated by their various physiological requirements.

Following this philosophy, whole blood may be centrifuged, the plasma separated and the red blood cells resuspended in saline to be employed in the treatment of those anemias where the defect is one primarily of insufficient numbers of red blood cells. The use of the pooled plasma which remains is indicated

* Presented at the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund, October 29-30, 1946.

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primarily in conditions like burns where plasma is lost. It should also be employed for the treatment of prothrombin deficiency or other diseases where the indicated component of plasma has not yet been isolated in a form safe and effective enough for general clinical use. The plasma not so employed may be fractionated to provide the following derivatives:

1. *Albumin.* Although this protein constitutes less than 60 per cent of the total plasma proteins, it is responsible for approximately 80 per cent of the osmotic activity of plasma. The intravenous injection of albumin is indicated in the treatment of shock, hypoproteinemia, and edema (3).
2. *Isohemagglutinins.* These are separated from plasma of group specific bloods and provide powerful and reliable substances for blood grouping (4).
3. *Fibrinogen.* The physical properties of blood clots depend on this protein which can be made into various plastic-like materials. Combined with thrombin, fibrinogen may be converted into clots with various physical properties (5).
4. *Fibrin foam.* These are made up of the same proteins that constitute blood clots and when employed with thrombin offer a substance which is effective as a topical agent for the control of venous bleeding. This has been most widely employed for neuro-surgical hemostasis (6).
5. *Fibrin Film.* This is a cellophane-like preparation of fibrinogen plus thrombin which may be used as a dural substitute (7).
6. *Antihemophilic globulin.* This is that fraction of the plasma which has been found to lower the clotting time of patients with hemophilia. This globulin is presumed to be the substance congenitally deficient in the blood of such patients.
7. *Gamma globulin.* This will be discussed in greater detail below.

B. NORMAL HUMAN SERUM GAMMA GLOBULIN

Concentrated normal human serum gamma globulin is that fraction of normal human plasma which contains the immune bodies usually present against infectious disease. Early in the course of the plasma fractionation program, it was appreciated that this protein might be of practical value in the control of

various diseases (8). The methods currently employed recover and concentrate about 75 per cent of gamma globulin in a purity of 95 per cent or better. Gamma globulin so prepared contains antibodies present in approximately twenty-five fold concentration over that found in the plasma from which it was derived (9). Thus, each 10.0 cc. of this material contains the antibody equivalent of approximately 250 cc. of pooled adult plasma or most of the immune bodies present in 500 cc. of whole blood. The preparations tested show a fairly constant titre of antibodies to the more common diseases present in the adult donor population. This may well be expected to vary somewhat from continent to continent or as the incidence of certain diseases may vary with a given group of adult donors. Accordingly, preparations containing unusually high titres of specific antibodies may be derived from the plasma of hyperimmune or convalescent patients. The gamma globulin derived from the fractionation of pooled normal adult plasma in the United States was soon demonstrated to be effective as a safe and reliable agent in the prophylaxis of measles (10) (11).

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES, ADMINISTRATION AND REACTIONS

Gamma globulin is prepared as a clear, colorless, viscid solution, which is stable for long periods of time. The present material may produce serious reactions if injected intravenously and it should therefore always be given by the intramuscular route. When so administered in the usual dosage, reactions occur in 1 to 2 per cent of the cases (12). About 0.2 per cent of inoculated patients experience general reactions such as headache or significant malaise. Significant local reactions in the nature of pain, redness and swelling are seen in 0.6 per cent and febrile reactions in 0.4 per cent. The use of gamma globulin has not resulted in the production of serum jaundice.

CLINICAL USE

I. MEASLES

A. Prophylaxis. If gamma globulin is given in doses of 0.1 cc.

per pound of body weight within the first six days after exposure to measles, the disease will be prevented in at least 80 per cent of exposed, susceptible contacts and modified in practically all the remaining contacts. The passive immunity achieved in this fashion will last for at least three weeks. If re-exposure occurs after this period of time, another similar inoculation should be given if prevention is still desirable. Measles should be prevented when exposure occurs in: (1) Infants younger than six months whose mothers are not immune; (2) infants between the age of six months and three years; (3) children who are debilitated or ill with another disease; (4) patients with pulmonary tuberculosis; (5) patients on hospital wards who, if allowed to have measles, might expose other sick patients; (6) children in whom the presence of measles would disturb the surrounding social environment to an unusual degree and (7) non-immune pregnant women, especially if exposed during the first trimester.

If gamma globulin is given in doses of 0.02-0.025 cc. per pound of body weight within the first eight days after exposure to measles, the disease will be modified in most of the exposed susceptible patients and prevented in relatively few. Although failure to achieve mild measles occurs in a small percentage of patients who develop the unmodified disease, gamma globulin appears to be the safest, most convenient, and effective agent now available. Comparison shows gamma globulin to be at least as effective and easier to use than the less easily available convalescent serum (13). Placental extract is less reliable for modification as well as for prevention of measles and results in a significantly greater incidence of both general and local reactions (14).

There is no absolute proof to date that this scheme of "active immunization" produces a lasting immunity, although most of the evidence on hand indicates that this is probably true in the vast majority of instances. It would, therefore, seem indicated to attempt to modify the disease in all children over the age of three years except for those exceptions listed above, which con-

stitute the various indications for prevention of the disease. Such a scheme permits the acquisition of permanent immunity while having a mild disease. If the disease is prevented, the individual may well have a future unrecognized exposure followed by severe unmodified measles. Another cogent argument in favor of attempted modification is that the measles complication rate has been ten times as high in the unmodified as in the modified variety with no fatal complications seen to date in the latter group (12).

Because of the variability of modified measles, the patient in whom this condition is anticipated must be observed carefully throughout the incubation period so that unusually mild forms are not overlooked. The classical findings of cough, coryza, conjunctivitis, Koplik spots, fever, malaise, and rash are usually present in varying degrees. Any of these cardinal symptoms may exist alone or in conjunction with any or all of the others. The incubation period is often prolonged to twenty-one days, although the average time is approximately fourteen days. In most cases, there is a moderately mild morbilliform rash which lasts a shorter period of time than that seen with average measles. In a small number of patients with mild measles, the rash may be absent. The respiratory symptoms which constitute such a striking and annoying part of average measles are usually mild and may often be absent. The temperature is rarely elevated beyond 103° and usually ranges between 100-102°, with little associated malaise or prostration.

B. Treatment. There is some evidence that the administration of gamma globulin in large doses (*i.e.* 15-30 cc.) during the pre-eruptive stage of measles may result in a partially attenuated form of the disease (15). The results are not yet well enough defined to merit using the material in the routine treatment of measles.

II. INFECTIOUS HEPATITIS

Several well controlled studies have established the fact that if gamma globulin is given in doses of 0.1 cc. per pound of body weight early in the incubation period of infectious hepatitis, a

very definite reduction in the case incidence of this disease will occur in intimately exposed individuals (16) (17) (18). The protection afforded by this procedure would not appear to indicate its general use in the vast majority of the casually exposed civilian population in view of the extremely low rate of cross infection. It would appear more rational to reserve the use of gamma globulin to attempt to prevent the disease when exposure occurs in (1) military personnel living in close contact with each other, (2) institutions where intimate exposures are considerable, (3) patients who suffer from some serious debilitating disease, and (4) pregnant women.

If gamma globulin is given in doses of 0.3 cc. per pound of body weight early in the course of infectious hepatitis, no apparent modification of the disease ensues (19).

The value of gamma globulin in the prevention of attenuation of homologous serum jaundice is not yet well defined (20).

III. MUMPS

Gamma globulin processed from the plasma of patients convalescing from mumps has been shown to decrease the incidence of orchitis in adult males significantly when given in doses of 20 cc. at the onset of the disease (21). Material prepared from normal adult plasma pools is without value in the prevention of mumps or of orchitis.

IV. PERTUSSIS

Gamma globulin processed from pooled hyperimmune pertussis serum is of definite value in passive immunization against whooping cough. This material is also of value in the treatment of pertussis, especially if therapy is instituted early in the course of the disease. Normal gamma globulin is again without apparent value.

V. POLIOMYELITIS

Gamma globulin has been used in unusually high doses for the treatment of pre-paralytic poliomyelitis without any apparent benefit (22). There is no clinical evidence that gamma globulin is of value in the prevention of poliomyelitis, although

there is evidence that human immune bodies may aid in preventing experimental transmission of the virus to laboratory animals (23).

VI. SCARLET FEVER

Studies are now being carried out to determine the value of both normal and convalescent gamma globulin in the prophylaxis and treatment of this disease. It appears likely that they may be of some value.

VII. GERMAN MEASLES

The possible use of gamma globulin in the prevention and treatment of this disease is under study.

VIII. CHICKEN POX

Normal gamma globulin is ineffective in the prevention of chicken pox and its role in treatment is unknown.

IX. INFANTILE DIARRHEA

The evidence to date indicates that gamma globulin is of no value in the prophylaxis and treatment of infantile diarrhea (24).

SUMMARY

Gamma globulin is that fraction of the plasma proteins which contains the immune bodies. Recent preparations of this material contain antibodies which are concentrated approximately twenty-five fold over the pooled plasma from which they are derived.

When given intramuscularly, it has proved to be a particularly effective and safe agent for the prevention and modification of measles. Gamma globulin is also capable of preventing or modifying infectious hepatitis in a large proportion of exposed individuals. Its role with regard to prophylaxis of homologous serum jaundice, mumps, scarlet fever, pertussis, poliomyelitis, and other infectious diseases is now being studied. Therapeutically, it may prove of value in the treatment of scarlet fever, pertussis, and very early measles. Gamma globulin from convalescent plasma has proved useful in reducing the incidence of orchitis in mumps.

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EUROPEAN MIGRATIONS: PREWAR TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

DUDLEY KIRK¹

IN the chaotic years through which Europe has just passed it has often seemed as though the entire European population were caught up in a swirling tide of human movement. One wave of refugees after another has swept across the continent. Whole populations during the war were arbitrarily uprooted from their ancient lands and set down in strange surroundings; at best they found poor quarters in their new homes, at worst they encountered the concentration camp and the extermination center. Millions of workers were recruited by force or persuasion to serve the combatants as cogs in the machines of war. These shifting currents left a large residue of permanently displaced persons, many of whom can never hope to return to the lands of their origin in decency or safety. Many more millions are being permanently exiled from the regions of their birth and nurture by the dictates of the peace.

The problems of the refugees and displaced persons ought properly to be one of the heaviest on the conscience of the world; they have been the subject of innumerable articles and an endless flow of debate. They have brought the problems of migration to the fore. But they may obscure the long range problems of Europe at peace. Now that international order is in the process of reestablishment, we should not overlook the broad picture, in which the refugee problem holds an important place without being the exclusive center of focus. Thus, what are the underlying migration potentials reflected in historical trends? What are the potential sources of postwar international migration? What are the potential outlets? What are the factors that determine the actual volume of migration? What elements in the postwar world are favorable to migration, what unfavorable?

In attacking these complicated questions it is useful to

¹ From the Office of Population Research, Princeton University.




Fig. 1. Origins and destinations of overseas emigration from Europe as measured by the statistics of European-born persons living in overseas countries.




Fig. 2. Net balance of international migrations within Europe as determined from place-of-birth and nationality statistics (including only those movements with a net balance exceeding 25,000 persons).

approach the problem at two levels, first, to evaluate the pre-war trends and the extent to which they reflect the underlying migration potentials, and, second, to consider how these basic migration potentials and their expression in actual migration may have been modified by the Second World War.

We may turn first to the migratory trends of the past, and especially to those migrations occurring in what are often regarded as more "normal" periods of European history than the recent past.² These movements are commonly thought to reflect the migration potentials existing in the absence of restrictive barriers and political disorder. They fall readily into a dichotomy: (a) overseas migration and (b) international migration within Europe.³

The residue of these two movements in the interwar period, as represented by place-of-birth statistics,⁴ is shown in Figures 1 and 2. In these maps the flow lines measure the balance of persons living outside their country of origin as reported in the countries of residence in the middle of the interwar period. It is obvious that on the numerical scale employed overseas emigration has been much the more important form of international migration of Europeans.⁵

² The following discussion of historical trends draws heavily on materials presented in the sections on migration in a forthcoming book by the author entitled *EUROPE'S POPULATION IN THE INTERWAR YEARS*. (In press.)

³ A distinction is often made between intercontinental and intracontinental migration, but the above distinction is a more usable one. Thus, movement across the indistinct land boundaries separating European and Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union, though intercontinental, are properly regarded as internal migration.

⁴ Supplemented in part by nationality statistics in those countries lacking usable statistics of place of birth.

⁵ The comparison is clearly not a rigorous one. Technically Figure 1 refers only to emigration and does not take account of persons born in other continents and living in Europe. These are of course a small number and their inclusion would not seriously modify the results, especially since they would undoubtedly be more than balanced by the number of European-born persons living in overseas countries not included in the computations. A second and more important basis of non-comparability is the fact that gross residue of migration for movements within the continent is much larger than the net balance indicated in Figure 2. Thus the total number of Europeans living outside their country of origin, but still in Europe was some 12 million, as compared with somewhat over 20 million Europeans in overseas countries, and there undoubtedly was a much more rapid turnover of migrants within the continent. The residue of overseas migration is thus greater than that of intracontinental migration, but not in so large a ratio as might be indicated by a hasty comparison of Figures 1 and 2.

THE GREAT MIGRATION

The peopling of other continents by Europeans is the largest and one of the most dramatic migrations in history. At least 60 million Europeans have sought new homes overseas since the first colonization efforts of the sixteenth century. Many perished or returned home disappointed; but the survivors and their descendants form a majority in areas that combined exceed Europe in size and natural resources. In many other regions Europeans and their descendants form a solid core of European cultural influence with or without direct political association with the mother continent.

Overseas emigration has been a well-nigh universal phenomenon in Europe. Every nation in Europe has fed the stream to overseas countries, and, as may be observed in Figure 1, the net residue of this movement amounted to sizable figures for all but the smallest countries of Eastern Europe.

It is obvious that so huge and generalized a movement was a response to very widespread motivations. It differed from earlier mass migrations in that it was a movement of individuals, not of tribes or of entire peoples. Furthermore, though there were many specific instances of forced deportation, the bulk of the overseas migration arose from voluntary choice and not as the result of expulsion. Although political and religious persecution were important causes of migration in colonial times, by the early nineteenth century economic motivations were firmly entrenched as the leading factor. As early as 1820, potential migrants were acquainted with the fluctuations of economic opportunity and migrated or not according to their information. The course of overseas migration for a century prior to the First World War was dominated by successive waves increasingly governed by the fluctuation of opportunity in the receiving countries and by the progress of alternative economic opportunities through industrialization at home.⁶ In contrast with preceding migrations it was notable

⁶ The individual motivations promoting early overseas migration are well set forth
(Continued on page 133)




Fig. 3. Average annual overseas emigration from Europe, 1846-1939, distinguishing (a) "old migration" from the British Isles, Scandinavia, Germany, Switzerland, France, and the Low Countries, and (b) "new migration" from the remaining countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe.

for the lack of interference by the governments of both sending and receiving countries in the free movement of individuals.

In the course of its development, overseas migration experienced widely recognized changes in its numerical volume, in

by Marcus Lee Hansen in *THE ATLANTIC MIGRATION, 1607-1860*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1940. This volume draws heavily on the opinions and personal accounts given in letters and contemporary periodicals. The high correlation between European emigration and economic conditions in the United States prior to the First World War is thoroughly documented in Jerome, Harry: *MIGRATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE*. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1926. The degree of coincidence of prosperity and European immigration in Canada and Australia is examined by William D. Forsyth in his *THE MYTH OF THE OPEN SPACES*. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1942, pp. 30-32. The importance of industrialization and prosperous business conditions in the countries of emigration as a deterrent to overseas emigration is discussed in the several chapters devoted to individual countries in Willcox, Walter F. (ed.): *INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS, Vol. II, INTERPRETATIONS*. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929. A detailed study with respect to a particular country with excellent statistics is incorporated in Thomas, Dorothy Swaine: *SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SWEDISH POPULATION MOVEMENTS, 1750-1933*. New York, Macmillan Co., 1941, pp. 166-169, 319-321.

the countries of its origin, and in the predominant character of the migration. Changes in the volume of overseas emigration from Europe are shown in Figure 3. It is apparent that there have been wide fluctuations, the movement rising and falling with changing economic conditions. But in the overall picture it is clear that there was a sharply rising trend in the seventy-five years preceding the First World War. The earlier mass migrations had been drawn chiefly from Western Europe, and especially from the British Isles, Germany, and Scandinavia. With improvements in communication and transportation, each new wave drew into its vortex people from an ever-widening perimeter of lands in Europe and each thereby surpassed its predecessor. In its later stages the great migration was notable for its enormous flood of "new migration" from the peasant regions of Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe. In the years just before World War I it reached a tremendous peak, with a total of 14 million in the decade 1906-1915.

THE END OF THE GREAT MIGRATION

The First World War marked a crucial turning point in the history of overseas emigration. The movement progressively shrank during the 'twenties, and in the 'thirties reached the lowest point in a hundred years. Even the movements of refugees in the late 'thirties were of little numerical significance relative to the earlier economically motivated migrations. The interwar period witnessed the fading and virtual disappearance of mass migration from Europe.

Thus, in rough figures, Europe lost a balance of 8 million through overseas emigration in the decade 1900-1910, and 5 million in the decade 1910-1920 despite the cessation of emigration during the First World War. There was some revival in the 'twenties, but the net loss of population was only about 3 million, the greater part of which occurred in the first half of the decade. During the 'thirties new European emigration was almost entirely offset by the return of earlier emigrants, there




Fig. 4. Overseas immigration into the chief countries of destination, 1900-1939 (for the United States: fiscal years).

being comparatively little revival of the overseas movement despite the improved economic conditions and the substantial number of political refugees set adrift in the last half of the decade. The relative importance of the latter may be illustrated by the fact that all of the European political refugees in 1939 amounted to less than the average annual emigration from Europe prior to the First World War.⁷

It has been easy to assert that the decline of overseas migration was the result of the two obvious causes: restrictive legislation and economic depression. These were undoubtedly of very great importance in the sharp curtailment of overseas migration that occurred in the interwar years. As may be observed in Figure 4, immigration into the United States fell off sharply following the institution of the quota system in 1921 and the legislation of even tighter restrictions in 1924.

⁷ Thus about 400,000 refugees were reported to have left greater Germany prior to September 1, 1939, and some 450,000 Spanish refugees entered France after the collapse of Republican Spain, of which about 140,000 still remained in February, 1940. Cf. Kulischer, Eugene M.: *THE DISPLACEMENT OF POPULATION IN EUROPE*. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1943, pp. 42-44. The average annual overseas migration in the decade preceding World War I was 1,400,000.

Furthermore, even the limited quotas of the 1924 law were far from filled in the economic depression of the 'thirties.

It is important to recognize, nevertheless, that there were important factors tending to restrict overseas migration quite aside from these specific causes. Two symptoms may be noted. First, it is significant that American quotas were not subject to severe pressure from the industrial countries of Western Europe even during the 'twenties. In fact, despite the absence of important legislative barriers, emigration from these countries has followed a downward secular trend since 1880.⁸ Second, it may be mentioned that despite oft-noted pressure on their American quotas there was relatively little substitute migration from Southern and Eastern Europe to other overseas countries not applying restrictions on the American pattern.⁹ The drop in the volume of immigration in the 'twenties was greatest in the United States, but there was also a decline from prewar levels in countries without such legislation. Thus the three major overseas countries of immigration after the United States, namely, Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, had a combined immigration of almost 800 thousand in 1913, but in no postwar year did their combined total reach half that figure.

The underlying forces reducing overseas migration were (a) changing economic opportunities in overseas countries and (b) the progress of industrialization and urbanization in Europe. Conditions in overseas countries were becoming less attractive to mass immigration as these countries developed the characteristics of more mature economies. The remaining "open spaces" were not suitable for intensive European settlement

⁸ Cf. Fig. 3. If proper allowance could be made for the increasing element of temporary migrants, especially British, in the interwar period the decline would be more pronounced. Another factor in maintaining substantial migration from Northwestern Europe was the renewal of German emigration owing to the difficult postwar conditions in that country.

⁹ As might be expected Canadian immigration increased somewhat with the curtailment of immigration into the United States, and there is some presumptive evidence that the migration to South America from Poland, for example, was larger in the late 'twenties than it would have been without the American quota system. But these were comparatively small diversions, and insufficient to maintain immigration in these countries of free immigration at prewar levels.

without extremely high capitalization and in any event their products were a glut on the international market.¹⁰ Furthermore, the changed opportunities were not simply a matter of the "filling up" of overseas countries, as is often supposed, but also of institutional changes in the economy. In the overseas countries, as in Europe, land has ceased to be regarded as the chief wealth and principal source of profitable occupation. Land long since lost its appeal to the majority of migrants, who have sought the more lucrative occupations of the towns. The greatest migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not chiefly composed of land-hungry peasants; they were essentially a rural-urban migration, from the overcrowded farmlands of Europe to the glittering opportunities for economic advancement presumed to exist in the cities of the New World.¹¹

In periods of rapid industrialization there has been a great demand for labor in overseas countries. But with increasing economic maturity, labor has also been a growing and more vocal force in national life. It has become increasingly effective, especially in the English-speaking countries, in its opposition to the competition of immigrant aliens. At the same time, increasingly important channels of social advancement in the "white collar" occupations are barred to the immigrant by differences in language and education. An expanding part of the labor force has been diverted to governmental and other service occupations, and in the United States, for instance, the alien is explicitly barred from the former. Furthermore, the increasing interest of government in the economic welfare of

¹⁰ The "myth of the open spaces" is especially well exposed in Forsyth, *op. cit.*, with reference to Australia. Surveys of the possibilities of this and other areas are discussed in Bowman, Isaiah (ed.): *LIMITS OF LAND SETTLEMENT*. New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1937; Bowman: *THE PIONEER FRINGE*. New York, American Geographical Society, 1931; Joerg, W. L. G. (Ed.): *PIONEER SETTLEMENT*. New York, American Geographical Society, 1932. The particular problems attendant on international resettlement are reviewed in Moore, Wilbert E.: *Economic Limits of International Resettlement*. *American Sociological Review*, 10: 27-281, April 1945.

¹¹ Thus as early as 1890, 62 per cent of the foreign-born white persons in the United States were resident in urban communities as compared with only 26 per cent of the native white. U. S. Census Bureau: *THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES*, Vol. I, *POPULATION*, 1910. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1913.

its citizenry works against migration. Thus the development of social insurance both at home and in the overseas countries intensifies the loss of economic security involved in migration. Finally, these economic disabilities have been bolstered by the rise of nationalism in overseas countries. The immigrant is no longer regarded as a welcome partner in the growth and the development of a new land. Instead, countries of immigration are increasingly concerned with the problems of assimilation. Such concern tends to defeat its own objectives by dissipating the atmosphere of tolerance in which assimilation and amalgamation most speedily occur.

Paralleling changed conditions in overseas countries were those in Europe weakening the drive and the opportunity to emigrate. Overseas emigration on the scale of the early twentieth century is probably in essence a transitional phenomenon in European life. In each area of Europe affected, emigration tended to be greatest in the early stages of modernization when the perspectives of the modern world first raised the aspirations in a peasant society without providing the means of their satisfaction at home. Also, in demographic terms, a drive to emigrate was promoted by the fact that the first phases of modernization reduced death rates without commensurate declines in the birth rate, thus creating rapid population growth. Especially in a static rural economy rapid population growth creates pressures on the land and a strong motive for emigration.¹²

The sources of heaviest migration have consequently moved across Europe with the widening circle of industrialization and modernization which have spread in all directions from their center of diffusion in Northwestern and Central Europe. After the first great wave of emigration in each area the movement has tended to subside. The pressure to emigrate is weakened by the further operation of the vital revolution, which in the more advanced stages of industrialization brings about a decline in the birth rate and a slowing of population growth. In its

¹² Cf. Moore, Wilbert E.: *ECONOMIC DEMOGRAPHY OF EASTERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE*. Geneva, League of Nations, 1945.

economic aspect the progress of modernization brings industrial development and the expansion of opportunities in the nearby towns and cities. Finally, in its political phases, modernization promotes national sentiment and greater resistance to the sacrifice of language and custom commonly involved in overseas migration. These sentiments were already being reinforced in the interwar period by national policies directed at discouraging or even prohibiting the movement.¹⁸

With the progressive modernization and growing nationalism in the countries of emigration there came a trend toward a drying up of the stream of migration at its source. Basic pressures to migrate still existed in the relatively backward countries; in the absence of restrictions and with economic prosperity in overseas countries these would certainly have provided a continuing overseas movement for some years to come. But viewed in the broader perspective the outlook for large-scale overseas emigration on the pattern of the past was distinctly unfavorable. In the normal course of events it seemed likely that the peopling of other continents from Europe was a passing phenomenon.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION WITHIN EUROPE

The trends of international migration within Europe have been somewhat different from those of overseas migration. This movement has been much more diversified as regards direction and has had smaller numerical results than overseas migration. Only within the past generation have there been mass migrations within Europe comparable to the overseas floods. There has always been a certain interchange of population across international boundaries attendant on commercial and cultural relationships, and this has served as a most important means of cultural diffusion. But these osmotic ex-

¹⁸ Thus emigration from Fascist Italy was made increasingly difficult with the withdrawal of favors to emigrants, e.g., in the form of cheap transportation to ports of embarkation; and after July, 1928, emigrants had to promise not to have their families follow them abroad. See Glass, David V.: *POPULATION POLICIES AND MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940, pp. 221-225. The strongest step was taken by the Soviet Union which forbade emigration altogether.

changes of population have consisted of relatively small numbers of technical personnel, agents, teachers, exiles, etc. By contrast, the chief interwar migrations were mass movements, one type the result of economically motivated and spontaneous migration on the part of individuals, the other the politically motivated flights of refugees and transfers of ethnic minorities.

The first of these has been a movement from countries of low levels of living and agrarian overpopulation to those of slower population growth and greater economic opportunities. Thus France, owing to her slow population growth and relatively high levels of living, has long attracted substantial numbers of workers from neighboring countries. In their periods of rapid industrialization prior to the First World War, Germany and Switzerland also attracted population from less developed neighboring countries. However, in the interwar years these earlier movements were dwarfed by a huge migration into France, amounting to a net balance of some two million immigrants in the decade 1920-1930; in the latter half of that decade France supplanted the United States as the chief country of European immigration. Though there were lesser movements into the Low Countries and England, "normal" international migration in Europe was preeminently a migration from the remainder of Europe to France. In the interwar period France gained population from almost every country in Europe, but above all from Italy and Poland, each of which supplied some half million migrants.

The 'thirties saw a termination of this movement with economic depression and the introduction of severe discriminatory measures against aliens in France. Even before, migratory movements in Europe had been increasingly enmeshed in treaties, restrictive decrees, and anti-alien legislation.¹⁴ These controls were of course greatly intensified in the depression years,

¹⁴ Cf. International Labour Office: *MIGRATION LAWS AND TREATIES*, Geneva, 1928, 2 vols. Some of these treaties (*cf.* that between France and Poland) were ostensibly for the purpose of regularizing migratory movements and protecting the migrant, but all reflected a growing concern of the governments in controlling migration and migrants in the service of national as well as of humanitarian interests.

and international migration understandably failed to revive with the economic recovery of the late 'thirties. The outstanding exception was the large immigration of workers into Germany in connection with the armament boom in the Third Reich. In the 'thirties, Germany replaced France as the chief country of European immigration, though this movement was drawn almost entirely from peoples of German speech living outside the boundaries of Germany proper. It was thus at once a migration motivated by economic advantage and by the desire to escape the disabilities of ethnic minority status.¹⁵

The other major type of international migration in Europe was that specifically associated with the liquidation of minorities and political dissidents. The model for this solution of minority problems was the Greco-Turkish exchange of populations in the early 'twenties. In the interwar period this was the outstanding case of forced migration,¹⁶ though there were large movements of population arising from the realignment of boundaries after the First World War,¹⁷ and especially as the result of the Communist Revolution in Russia.¹⁸

With the resurgence of the more virulent forms of nationalism in the 'thirties migrations motivated by political condi-

¹⁵ The movement was a large one, probably totalling three-quarters of a million, since in the intercensal period 1933-1939 the old Reich gained 500 thousand through migration over and above the loss of some 250 thousand political expatriates. The bulk of the migration came from Austria and the Sudetenland, some of it undoubtedly occurring after the incorporation of these areas in the Reich and to that extent not representing international, but internal migration. There were also substantial contingents from German ethnic minorities and of German citizens returning from abroad. Ethnic foreigners were few, the largest group comprising about 50 thousand Italians.

¹⁶ In this exchange over a million Greeks were returned from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace and some 400 thousand Moslems were expelled from Greece. The exchanges of population affecting Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey are described in Ladas, S. P.: *THE EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES: BULGARIA, GREECE, AND TURKEY*. New York, Macmillan, 1932.

¹⁷ Cf. Figure 2. It should be noted that the migrations shown are in some cases "international" only after the fact. Thus, much of the large migration from Czechoslovakia to Austria (*i.e.*, Vienna) occurred as internal migration before the war and the subsequent erection of a political barrier between the areas. The movements into Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria depicted in Figure 2 are a combination of prewar internal migration, refugee movements, and postwar international migration.

¹⁸ The nature and problems of the many movements of political refugees in the interwar period are described in Simpson, John Hope: *THE REFUGEE PROBLEM: REPORT OF A SURVEY*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1939.

tions again came to the fore. As noted above, there were some 400 thousand refugees from Nazi oppression in the Third Reich. The Spanish Civil War resulted in the exile of many thousands more. Finally, at the close of the interwar period the liquidation of minorities through officially sponsored transfers of population gained increasing favor as a means of achieving internal unity and "racial" purity, though actual movements (*e.g.*, of ethnic Germans "returning" to the Reich), had only begun.¹⁹

The outlook for voluntary international migration on the patterns of the past was quite unfavorable in the last days of the interwar period. The geographical barriers which formerly impeded migration had been largely swept aside by modern transportation; correspondingly, the traditional immobility of the peasant rooted in the soil had been weakened by the impact of the modern world. But in place of the physical barriers to transportation and communication had arisen man-made walls restraining the free flow of migration except as desired by the state. The predominant forms of international migration in Europe at the end of the interwar period were already those of refugees fleeing political discrimination or of forced population transfers to meet the political conveniences of the moment. The intensification of nationalism in both sending and receiving countries gave little hope of a renewal of large-scale economically motivated migration without a very substantial lowering of international tensions.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The war produced enormous movements of people in Europe. Kulischer estimated a total of 30 million persons in 1943 moved from their homes as the result of military campaigns, refugee flights, forced evacuations, and the recruitment of labor to feed the Axis war machine.²⁰ This number was of course much enlarged by subsequent military action and refugee movements

¹⁹ Except that the liquidation of Moslem minorities in Bulgaria and Rumania through guided migration had been continuing through the 'thirties.

²⁰ Kulischer, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

attendant on the retreat and collapse of the Axis forces. In the course of the war there were also elaborate transfers and resettlement programs designed to eliminate ethnic minorities. Many of Europe's troublesome minority problems were liquidated effectively, though ruthlessly, in this process.²¹ The displacement of Axis populations in Eastern Europe as a result of the new territorial arrangements, have added many million more to the huge total of persons forced to move as a result of the war.

POTENTIAL SOURCES AND DESTINATIONS OF POSTWAR MIGRATION

A casual survey might suggest that we are on the verge of a great resurgence of international migration from and within Europe. On the one hand, there is evidence of a great eagerness to emigrate on the part of many Europeans; on the other hand, there are numerous reports of ambitious schemes and plans for large-scale immigration, both in overseas countries and in France, long the chief country of immigration in Europe.

Thus on the one side, we hear accounts of a great desire to emigrate from Europe, very clearly heard from displaced persons, less clearly heard from the more settled peoples. Though much the greater number of war refugees returned to their countries of origin, there remain 850 thousand displaced persons, the "hard core," available for overseas migration or for relocation in European countries other than those of their origin. These are clearly raw material for present and future international migration. Beyond these are the surviving Jews of Eastern Europe, a large proportion of whom seem eager to leave Europe at any cost.²²

²¹ The complicated skein of transfers is carefully described in Schechtman, Joseph B.: *EUROPEAN POPULATION TRANSFERS: 1939-1945*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1946.

²² According to an opinion poll taken in Greater Budapest 64 per cent of the resident Jews wished to emigrate and 12 per cent more were hesitating. The comparable proportions among Christians of Jewish descent were 40 per cent and 12 per cent. Of the combined total, 55 per cent desired to emigrate, 30 per cent expressing a preference for America, 20 per cent for Palestine, and 5 per cent for "anywhere." Hungarian Institute of Public Opinion, release of March, 1946.

In addition to the refugees and displaced persons, there is presumably a large reservoir of persons, who, for one reason or another, would like to escape the hard living conditions and political chaos of contemporary Europe. In recent months public opinion surveys have been carried on in several European countries relating to the question of emigration. The polls indicate that substantial proportions of the populations in these countries are favorable to emigration, and that the thought of emigration is widespread even in the economically most favored countries of the West. Thus, in the Netherlands, 22 per cent of the sample stated that if they had the choice they would prefer to go and live in another country.²³ In a wartime survey in Great Britain, 18 per cent indicated that they had thought of going to live in another country after the war.²⁴ Replying to a much more rigorous test of desire to emigrate, 4 per cent of the Danish people surveyed stated that they seriously planned to emigrate as soon as travelling difficulties eased.²⁵ Even in France, which herself hopes to attract millions of immigrants, a substantial proportion of the population indicated a preference for living in another country if given a free choice.²⁶

On the other side there have been numerous references in the press to grandiose plans of large-scale immigration and of colonization and settlement in the so-called underpopulated countries overseas. Thus Australia, for example, is alleged to be a country suitable for occupation by 20 million people (well over twice its present population); in a statement to the Aus-

²³ Nederlandsch Instituut voor de publieke Opinie, release of April 1, 1946.

²⁴ British Institute of Public Opinion, poll taken in September, 1943.

²⁵ Danak Gallup Institut, release of September 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 4, Winter, 1946-1947, p. 617.

²⁶ Asked in 1945 what nationality they would prefer, 19 per cent indicated some nationality other than French. In 1946, two comparable surveys were made asking the question "If you had a choice, which would you prefer, to stay in France or to go and live in another country?" In January, 26 per cent expressed a preference for a different country, of which 9 per cent preferred European countries (in order: Switzerland, Great Britain, and Russia), 12 per cent America, and 6 per cent the French colonies. In the later (August) poll the total per cent expressing a preference for a foreign country had fallen to 16 per cent. Institut français d'opinion publique, release of September, 1946.

tralian House of Representatives on August 2, 1945, the Minister for Immigration stated that defense considerations dictated a vast increase of population; Australia could readily absorb a 2 per cent increase per annum, and since natural increase could only be expected to furnish about half of this, a migration ceiling of 1 per cent growth per annum (now about 70,000) is appropriate.²⁷ Brazil was reported to be officially eager to import 1,200,000 Italians, 500,000 Portuguese, and 600,000 Central Europeans,²⁸ not to mention farmers from the United States²⁹ and a general open door to all white races. The Argentinian Director of Migration, Dr. Santiago M. Peralta, reported a fifty-year plan to increase Argentina's population to 100 million, with an annual immigration of 100,000 farmers annually.³⁰ In Canada there have been proposals to settle northern regions with displaced persons. In the United States there has been constant agitation to admit refugees by special dispensation outside the regular quota system.

In Europe, responsible Frenchmen have spoken of importing up to two million workers in the next ten years to assist in the reconstruction of France. Even in Britain some individuals have discussed the desirability of making England the "melting pot" of Europe, or perhaps a sort of processing plant in which Europeans are received, converted to loyal Britons, and then passed on to the Dominions or retained in Britain as replacements for the overseas Empire.³¹

A NEW ERA OF MASS MIGRATION?

Between the eagerly expressed desire for migrants in several of the countries of potential immigration and the favorable attitudes of many Europeans towards emigration, it might be

²⁷ *International Labour Review*, 52, No. 4, October, 1945, pp. 402-403.

²⁸ According to plans approved by the Constitution Commission (*New York Times*, April 11, 1946).

²⁹ *Ibid.*: May 18, 1946.

³⁰ *New York Times*: August 15, 1946 and *Inter-American*: No. 5, August, 1946, p. 45.

³¹ Benvenisti, J. L.: New Melting Pot? *Commonweal*, 43, March 29, 1946, pp. 590-592.

assumed that we are about to see a great revival of international migrations affecting Europe as soon as the means of transportation and communication are made available and the political channels have been reopened. But those who would like to migrate are not necessarily those desired by the countries of immigration and action may fall far short of expressed intentions and plans.

Let us turn first to the potential sources of migration. It is immediately evident that what were formerly the greatest potential sources of European migration now fall within the Soviet sphere of influence. Almost since its founding the Soviet Union has forbidden free emigration from the USSR. Except in certain population exchanges conducted for the purpose of eliminating troublesome minorities, the example of the Soviet Union is now being followed by several Eastern European countries and there is every reason to believe that the remaining countries in this area are likely to discourage emigration in order to husband their human resources.

There are many symptoms of the vital interest of Eastern European countries in maintaining large populations to justify their national ambitions. Several of the Eastern European countries have suffered heavy population losses through the decimations of war, through the expulsion of minorities, and through the flights of political refugees. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example, there exists an acute shortage of manpower; these countries face difficult problems in recruiting natives to take the place of Germans driven from the Sudetenland and the old German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. In other countries under Soviet influence, the Russian policies of promoting rapid population growth are being followed. Thus Yugoslavia apparently forbids emigration of her ethnic nationals, and in Bulgaria a strong pronatalist policy had already been put into effect before the war. The prospects for international migration from Eastern Europe to France and to the overseas countries seem highly unfavorable.

As has been pointed out above, Western Europe before the

war was a declining source of migration, actual and potential, owing to industrialization and to the slowing of population growth. The war has apparently provoked a new desire to emigrate if we may believe the surveys of popular opinion. However, it would be unwise to assume that anything like the proportions of the populations expressing preference for residence in a foreign country represent a long-lasting reservoir of large-scale emigration. There is some suggestion that the interest in emigration will abate rapidly with the amelioration of economic conditions and the establishment of greater political stability. A possible index of this is the sharp decline of persons in France expressing a preference for living in a foreign country. As noted above, in the few months between January and August, 1946, this proportion fell from 26 per cent to 16 per cent.

Even if large-scale emigration were to commence in those countries of Western Europe concerned about declining rates of population growth, it seems highly probable that it would quickly be discouraged by governmental action. Thus, in Norway, 51 per cent of those polled in a recent survey felt that unrestricted emigration of Norwegian citizens should not be permitted and 26 per cent felt that emigration should be completely restricted.³²

There remain two great sources of potential migration, namely, Italy and Germany. Italy, with her low standards of living and high rates of natural increase, will have large surpluses available for migration for some time to come.³³ The 13 million displaced Germans are undoubtedly the greatest single potential source of migration. Already torn loose from their homes and having little prospect of satisfactory economic adjustment in rump Germany, these people offer an enormous reservoir for international and especially for overseas migration. Countries unwilling to take Germans and Italians are

³² Norsk Gallup Institutt, release of September 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 4, Winter 1946-1947, p. 617.

³³ Spain has furnished a large amount of emigration in the past, but now has a pronatalist population policy and discourages emigration.

unlikely to attract large-scale European migrations in the postwar world.

Furthermore, the potential countries of immigration are far from ready to accept unrestricted migration. The United States, so long the chief destination of European emigration, has shown no disposition to liberalize its immigration restrictions. In a period of acute labor shortage it has not seriously considered changing the basic European quotas of the prewar period and efforts to suspend them temporarily to accommodate refugees have failed. The quotas provide for a maximum of approximately 150,000 per annum, a figure only one-eighth as high as the amount of immigration received from Europe in single years prior to World War I.³⁴ In a public opinion survey only 5 per cent of those questioned wished to see more persons from Europe admitted than came to the United States in the years before the war and a majority wished to see the number reduced or to eliminate European immigration altogether. Attitudes against European immigration were especially prevalent among veterans and among members of labor unions.³⁵

In other countries of potential immigration the rather loose generalizations regarding the need and prospects of European immigration will not bear too close scrutiny when it comes to particular cases. Thus Australia, for instance, wants immigrants, but chiefly those that can be readily assimilated to Australian institutions. A poll taken last spring indicated that in the sample taken only 35 per cent favored unrestricted white immigration in the next ten years, and only 28 per cent and 10

³⁴ The actual ceiling is slightly above 150,000 owing to the fact that every country is given a quota minimum of 100 regardless of its allocation on the national origins principle. On the other hand the maximum presumes that every nation would fill its full quota.

³⁵ To the question "Should we permit more persons from Europe to come to this country each year than we did before the war, should we keep the number about the same, or should we reduce the number," the replies were: More—5 per cent, Same—32 per cent, Fewer—37 per cent, None at all—14 per cent, No opinion—12 per cent. Of the total, 51 per cent advocated less immigration or none at all, while the comparable percentage for labor union members was 53 per cent, for veterans 56 per cent. American Institute of Public Opinion, release of January 14, 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 1, Spring, 1946, pp. 113-114.

per cent, respectively, favored immigration of Germans and Italians.³⁶ Though Australia expressed herself to the United Nations Refugee Committee as prepared to receive 70,000 European refugees annually, this offer was made subject to the easing of the economic situation, which in Australia meant the reestablishment of veterans and war workers in peacetime occupations, alleviation of the housing shortage, and the provision of adequate shipping. Canadian attitudes towards immigration are even less favorable than those in Australia. Of those asked in a 1946 opinion poll, only 21 per cent wished to see a large immigration from Europe and only 37 per cent even from the British Isles.³⁷

More favorable attitudes towards immigration from Europe have been displayed in Latin America. An opinion survey in Brazil recently showed 80 per cent favoring governmental measures to encourage the admission of new immigrants.³⁸ At the present writing Brazilian postwar immigration policy is still in the process of crystallization. In the recent past Brazil has applied very rigid restrictions with a tight quota system; her 1939 laws provided for maximum quotas of 3,000 from each European country, 80 per cent of which had to be agriculturalists. In short, Brazil desired only farmers, or persons whose technical qualifications could contribute to the acceleration of the rapid industrialization proceeding in that country. This industrialization may provide economic attractions and opportunities to European immigrants as it did at an earlier date in the United States. However, it is very questionable if immigration will provide a direct source of settlers for much of the country's hollow, practically uninhabited interior. In Brazil, as in most other sections of the world, areas are sparsely

³⁶ Australian Public Opinion Polls, release of May-June, 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 2, Summer, 1946, p. 261. It may be noted that the proportion favoring unlimited immigration had declined from the 42 per cent figure obtained in a 1943 survey using the same question.

³⁷ Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, release of April 24, 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 2, Summer, 1946, pp. 260-261. Opposition to immigration was especially evident among French Canadians.

³⁸ Instituto Brasileiro do Opiniao Publico e Estatistico, release of September, 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 4, Winter, 1946-1947, p. 617.

populated precisely because they offer little economic opportunity. Furthermore, their effective settlement goes against the prevailing migratory trends of the day, which in Brazil, as in almost every other nation of the world, now favor the cities over the rural regions.

Similarly, Argentina's plans to achieve a population of 100 millions, and the advocated implementation of this program by immigration of 100,000 farmers per year, would fly in the face of the centripetal tendencies in migration even if no restrictions were attached. As it is Dr. Peralta, the Director of Migration, is quoted as asserting that immigrants "must be strong, healthy, and unaffected by the war. The misery that is left of war-torn Europe must remain there. Argentina cannot put up with that useless human wreckage." He also emphasized that Argentina must "avoid the settlement of racially inferior people."³⁹

Though conditions are still in flux in overseas countries there are no immediate prospects for the general liberalization of the restrictive policies in force in most of them before the war. Of the countries responding to questions posed by the United Nations Division of Refugees not a single one indicated an unconditional willingness to take refugees or displaced persons. Australia, for example, stated that she could not accept any non-British immigration for at least two years. Brazil, originally stated to be willing to accept 100,000-200,000, indicated that she could now accept only a very much smaller (unspecified) number.⁴⁰

When plans are brought down to specific cases the immigrant usually has few partisans. If compromises must be made it is easy to make them at the expense of the potential migrant or alien who does not vote. This is especially true in the more industrialized English-speaking overseas countries, where the

³⁹ *New York Times*, August 15, 1946. Plans discussed for the admission of 1,000 Norwegian "quislings" and negotiations to bring General Ander's Polish army were later denied and at the time of writing nothing apparently has been done to suit action to rather bold words.

⁴⁰ *Aide-memoire to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations*, September 14, 1946.

strength of labor parties generally assures the continuation of restrictive measures.

Many of the overseas countries genuinely desire immigration; but in practice they are usually willing to accept mass migration only when the migrants will take places at the bottom of the economic ladder. Aside from numerically unimportant technical personnel they want persons who will occupy jobs and lands that are too poor to meet their own economic requirements.

Similarly, in the potential countries of immigration in Europe, general statements are very quickly subject to qualification in terms of actual policy. In the case of Britain, for example, the two outstanding concrete proposals for immigration relate to coal miners and to domestic servants, in order to fill occupations that native English do not care to occupy. Furthermore strong opposition has been expressed to such an obvious means of recruitment as the settlement of Polish troops not desiring to return to Poland.⁴¹

Or we may take the case of France, in which questions of migration are a vital issue. In the first place there is a division of interest among the advocates of immigration, notably as between those interested in securing a labor supply for reconstruction and those who are concerned with immigration as a demographic measure. The first, concerned at once with the necessities of the economy and with the interests of French workers, are desirous of securing a large working force immediately and are much less interested in the permanent effects on the French population. French demographers, on the other hand, have laid down a rational basis for an immigration policy best suited to strengthen the weak points in the demographic structure of France. Thus they advocate the immigration of adults at ages 26-35, in order to fill in the gashes in the age pyramid arising from the birth deficits of the First World

⁴¹ In a recent survey only 30 per cent approved of the Government's decision to permit Polish troops unwilling to return to Poland to remain in England. British Institute of Public Opinion, June 1946, cited in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10, No. 3, Fall, 1946, p. 437.

War. Instead of the characteristic migration of young single males they prefer more equal proportions of the sexes and the immigration of families with young children, the latter serving to strengthen the small cohorts of children born in France during the past decade, and thereby to offset the high proportion of the aged in the French population.⁴²

A more serious difficulty arises from the extremely important political considerations hampering the choice and attraction of migrants. Thus the introduction of so obvious a source of immigration as the displaced persons (especially the Poles and the Balts) was balked by political opposition from both inside and outside of France. Political objections have also naturally been raised against the permanent immigration of Germans and Spaniards, and even against the Algerian colonial citizens of France. For the time being, at least, immigration from Eastern Europe has been written off. Though immigration from Scandinavia and the Low Countries would be welcomed, it is recognized that aside from the Netherlands these countries have no population surpluses and in any event their citizens are not likely to be drawn to France. In practice prospective sources of mass immigration into France have narrowed down to Italy and, under special circumstances, Germany.

The above survey indicates that the war has not improved the outlook for the revival of free international migration of Europeans. It seems likely that a modest flow of Europeans to overseas destinations will appear, and that there will be a substantial movement from Italy into France. But even more than in the interwar period it seems probable that migratory movements of the future will be highly selective; they will be closely controlled, where not actually choked off, by the intervention of interested governments. There are few grounds for either hope or fear that the great spontaneous migrations of the past will be revived in the postwar world.

⁴² Cf. Vincent, Paul: *Vieillissement de la population retraites et immigration*. *Population*, 2, April-June, 1946, pp. 213-244.

POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF MIGRATION

CARTER GOODRICH¹

I HAVE been asked to discuss the possibilities and limits of international control of migration. "Possibilities and Limits,"—I think these words were chosen with care. Let me begin with the limits.

The most cursory examination of the question shows how far we are from "One World" in any literal sense of the phrase. If the United Nations were really One World, we might expect that the movement of individuals from one nation to another would be as free from restrictions as movement from one to another of the states of the United States. Or alternatively, if migration were not to be entirely free, we might expect that, in a One World, it would be a world body which decided which regions should be open to immigration and on what terms. Obviously we are far from any such situation. Discussion in international bodies may influence the immigration policies of individual nations; witness the interesting precedent of the Indian-South African issue on the agenda of the recent session of the General Assembly. Conceivably such discussion might even influence our own policy. Moreover, for certain special areas such as the trust territories, some questions regarding migration may become matters for decision or review by an international authority. But no one need either hope or fear that the major decisions on international migration will soon be taken in any such way. Freedom to migrate is not held to be one of the fundamental freedoms, though I have heard the great French labor leader, Léon Jouhaux, argue that it should be. For the foreseeable future, migration between nations will not be free and unrestricted; and it will continue to be the Congress of the United States and not the Assembly of the United Nations which determines who may enter the United States.

These limitations are obvious and I doubt if they are worth

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debating. Indeed, if we were to take the word "Control" in my title strictly, perhaps I should consider my assignment already completed. But I hope you will permit me to interpret my subject more broadly as referring to international action in the field, for in the guidance of migration there remain genuine and significant possibilities of international cooperation. Here, indeed, the contrast between international and internal migration is not so great as may sometimes be thought. Dr. Penrose has pointed out that "in practice," for the world as a whole, "migration has never taken place on a scale adequate to bring the distribution of population into anything approaching a close correspondence with the distribution of resources."² But this applies not merely between nations but also between parts and sections of a country like the United States. Even with legal freedom of movement, and in spite of all our traditional mobility, the statement remains obviously true.³

To improve this distribution within the United States, we do not take Americans and put them where we think they'll be well off. We have, however, found that we can do some useful though limited things by conscious planning. We have used the United States Employment Service to assist prospective migrants with information concerning opportunities at a distance and with aid in reaching them; and in my judgment we should do much more by this means than we have done. Through the Resettlement Administration and other agencies, federal and state, we found that it was possible to do something to keep settlement from hopeless areas, to rescue some of the victims of misguided settlement, and—rather less confidently—to promote settlement in more promising areas.⁴ The National Resources Board, moreover, and our regular Departments have studied the distribution of our resources in sufficient detail to make such guidance possible.

² Penrose, E. F.: *POPULATION THEORIES AND THEIR APPLICATION*. Stanford University, Food Research Institute, 1934, pp. 177-178.

³ Goodrich, Carter and Associates: *MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY*. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936, Ch. IX.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Part II.

The possibilities of international action are somewhat analogous. The need for it may be thought of as more urgent, since the chances that the individual migrant can successfully make his own investigations and his own arrangements are in general less. Many have argued that migratory movements between nations must be more "orderly" or more closely organized than in the past. Paul van Zeeland, for example, in presiding over the recent meeting of the International Labour Organisation's Permanent Migration Committee, declared that: "Spontaneous migration, as in the past, was possible in a less organized world when there was much free land." Dr. Kirk has referred earlier to the possibilities of immigration again becoming "free on the old patterns." Again, the contrast—though real—may not be as great as it appears. How much of mass migration overseas has ever been "spontaneous" in the full sense? How much of it, that is, has been the movement of individual migrants deciding independently on their destinations and buying tickets to that destination out of their own resources? Call the roster of methods of migration organized on a large scale by business enterprise or by government action—slavery; the transportation of indentured servants—which played so great a part in our origins that most white Americans claiming colonial ancestry would be eligible for membership in the Sons and Daughters of American Indenture; the transportation of convicts overseas; indenture again in the nineteenth century moving very large numbers of migrants from Asia to destinations in the Atlantic and the Pacific; contract labor in our own nineteenth century; state-aided migration from Britain to the Dominions; and so on. Poverty fills the emigrant ships, and poor men cannot usually plan and pay for long sea voyages. The problem is less that of substituting organized for unorganized migration than that of finding ways of organizing or guiding migration that are consistent with the standards we wish to apply today to human and to international relations.

There are already, of course, significant precedents and beginnings of international action. The plight of refugees could

not fail to force itself on international attention. Their emergency rescue has been recognized, however imperfectly, as an international responsibility necessitating the use of public funds as well as the activity and the money of devoted private agencies. A series of intergovernmental bodies—the Nansen Office and its successor agencies for refugees for the First World War; the League High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany; the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees in its two forms, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—have faced this responsibility. With the hard core—a very hard core—of the refugee problem remaining unsolved, the United Nations has before it as a pressing issue the organization of a new agency, the International Refugee Organization, and the determination of the power and resources to be given to it. The tragic basis of initial selection, and the difficult political decisions as to which of the "uprooted persons" are to be treated as permanent refugees and which are to be sent back to their own countries, set this problem apart. The special circumstances have necessitated the expenditure of sums for emergency maintenance, particularly by UNRRA, of a magnitude quite out of the range of any suggested aid to ordinary migration. Yet on the ultimate problems of placement and settlement, the problem of the refugee merges with that of the more ordinary migration in search of wider economic or social opportunity.

For the more ordinary forms of migration, discussion centers on two lines of activity—first, the setting of international standards to which the organization of migration should conform; and second, the specific encouragement or organization of migration by international agencies. The principal illustrations of the former lie in a series of Conventions and Recommendations adopted at successive conferences of the International Labour Organisation.⁵ The subjects covered include informa-

⁵ International Labour Office: *INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CODE*, Book XI, pp. 519-542. The specific quotations in this and the two subsequent paragraphs are from Articles 852, 856, 869, 875, and 883, respectively. The reference indicates which

(Continued on page 157)

tion and assistance to migrants. Nations should, for example, "enact and enforce penalties for the repression of misleading propaganda relating to emigration and immigrations"; and either public agencies or voluntary nonprofit organizations should supply to migrants "in their languages or dialects or at least in a language which they can understand" information regarding "employment and living conditions in the place of destination, return to the country of origin" and similar questions. Other provisions call for regulations of the operations of recruitment, introduction and placement for migrants from abroad, and for the exclusion from such operations of private employment agencies conducted for profit. Still others list the points to be covered in case the state is to supervise the terms of the contract between the migrant and the recruiting agency. Another recommendation deals, somewhat cautiously, with the charges for recruitment, transport and placing and expresses the opinion that these charges "should not, as a rule, be borne by the migrant." Still other provisions cover repatriation and the protection of migrants on board ship.

A quite different set of provisions deals with the conditions under which the migrant shall work in the new country. The leading principle is that of "equality of treatment" with nationals. This principle should apply, so far as the questions are matters of government regulation, to "conditions of work and more particularly remuneration, and the right to be a member of a trade union." Again, subject in some cases to the extension of reciprocal treatment, foreigners should have the same rights and benefits as nationals under unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation and other forms of social insurance.

Finally, a 1939 Recommendation suggests that states "between which the volume of migration is fairly considerable or between which collective migration takes place" should conclude "bilateral or plurilateral agreements" regulating more precisely the recruitment, introduction and placement of mi-

grants. A considerable number of such agreements were in force between European countries during the years between the wars.⁶ During the war an agreement between the governments of the United States and Mexico provided in unusual detail for the protection of Mexican workers imported into the United States.

When the I.L.O.'s Permanent Migration Committee met last August in Montreal, it regarded this as one of the most promising lines of further development. One of its principal recommendations was that the International Labour Conference should be asked to draw up a "model agreement" which would guide governments in negotiating bilateral agreements. Such a model agreement would—it was suggested—include the principles contained in the earlier conventions and recommendations. It would, however, go further than the latter, which were almost entirely concerned with migration for wage employment, and add standards that would be applicable to migration for agricultural or mixed agricultural and industrial settlement. In particular, it would include provisions relating to the technical selection and vocational training of migrants and perhaps also to the methods of organizing colonization enterprises.⁷

Here, then, is a process of standard-setting which has had value in the past and promises somewhat greater usefulness in the future. If the nations ratify these conventions, if they follow these recommendations, if they base their agreements on the proposed "model," migration should be more orderly than in the past. It should be conducted with less heedlessness of human needs and should give rise to fewer human tragedies. Yet these methods, promising as they are, have the same limitation as most of the methods worked out for the guidance of migration within the United States. They are likely to be more effective in preventing unsuccessful movement than in promoting successful movement. Certainly they give no guarantee of promoting any great increase in migratory movement.

⁶ *Ibid.*, footnote to p. 535.

⁷ International Labour Office, Permanent Migration Committee: "Report," (mimeographed) 1946, p. 14 and Appendix II. This will be printed as an appendix to the Minutes of the Governing Body.

This point was recognized in the discussions of the Permanent Migration Committee. Many speakers stressed "the necessity of international cooperation in fulfilling the conditions necessary for a large-scale immigration." The Committee's Report noted "with satisfaction that the representatives of several immigration countries have reported the readiness of their governments to receive a considerable number of immigrants, both industrial and agricultural, as soon as satisfactory arrangements can be made, more particularly for their transport, reception, and absorption into the national community."⁸ Yet financing could not in all cases be carried on successfully by the countries immediately concerned. The International Labour Office has agreed that "the financing of migration must be considered as a part of general economic development and the revival of international trade. If a country is carrying out development schemes and if these schemes require immigration of labor for their execution, the necessary additional capital for such migration might naturally be provided within the framework of the general expenditure on the development project, whether the sources for this expenditure are national or foreign investment."⁹

Impressed by this reasoning, the Committee suggested that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development should be urged

- (a) when it considers projects of economic development, to take into account the extent to which such projects contribute towards the solution of migration problems
- (b) when it makes loans for economic development, to include migration costs in appropriate cases within the scope of such development.¹⁰

In my judgment the proposal has genuine interest and relative merit. If the Bank is to pursue a bold and generous policy of

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 5 and 20.

⁹ International Labour Office, Permanent Migration Committee: "Forms of International Cooperation in the Field of Migration" (mimeographed), 1946, p. 46.

¹⁰ International Labour Office, Permanent Migration Committee: "Report," p. 24.

development—and if it does not it will not fulfill the hopes placed upon it—one of its important criteria of judgment should indeed be the effect of its decision on the distribution of the world's population in relation to resources.

In outlining these possibilities of international action, I have deliberately paid little attention to questions of organization. I have not discussed the proposals for a separate specialized agency to deal with migration. I am not anxious to raise questions of jurisdiction. My material has been drawn heavily from the experience of the I.L.O. and from the discussions of one of its committees. The I.L.O. has succeeded in enlisting the cooperation of both emigration and immigration countries. It has started to do a job and should go on with it. But obviously it can do only a part of the total job. Its own Committee urged all countries to cooperate in the task "through the appropriate organs of the United Nations and through appropriate specialized agencies."¹¹ Its boldest single proposal, as we have seen, was one for action by the International Bank. The study of migration needs and possibilities is an essential function of the Economic and Social Council and its Population Commission. Certainly the concerted and coordinated effort of the family of international organizations is needed if we are to make full use of the possibilities of international action in the field of migration.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF OUR IMMIGRATION LAWS AND POLICIES

E. P. HUTCHINSON¹

IN tracing the course of immigration law one finds a continual process of amendment. New problems of immigration arise from time to time to require new legislation, and administrative difficulties encountered in the enforcement of the existing law call for its modification. But the underlying immigration law and immigration policy are little affected. The pattern of regulation of immigration to the United States has been set by a few major acts, beginning with the original immigration act of 1882. Since that time there have been only four comprehensive immigration acts, those of 1891, 1903, 1907, and 1917, and for the most part these acts represented little marked change in immigration law and policy. Each succeeding act incorporated the substance of the preceding law, often with little or no change of wording, reaffirming and building on the earlier legislation rather than departing widely from it.

Status at World War II. At the outbreak of World War II immigration to the United States was still largely controlled by legislation of the first world war period. The basic law regulating the admission of aliens was the Immigration Act of 1917. Superimposed on but not superseding the 1917 act was the Quota Act of 1924. The 1917 act, passed at a time of heightened concern over problems of immigration and alienage, contained the most severely restrictive controls of immigration that had yet been adopted by Congress. Included in the act were additions to the number of excludable classes, the many times vetoed literacy test, and the Asiatic barred zone provisions. The Quota Act of 1924, containing the national origins quota formula, can also be regarded as a product of the first world war period for it was directly motivated by fear of excessive immigration after the war. The literacy test contained in the 1917

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act was presumably designed not only as a selective measure but also for restrictive purposes. That is, an apparent intent in the literacy test was to limit the volume of immigration, and especially that from certain less favored parts of Europe. Soon after the war, however, the test was found to be ineffective as a barrier to large-scale immigration. To provide such a barrier the first quota act was passed as a temporary measure in 1921, and was followed by the permanent Quota Act of 1924.

The 1917 and 1924 acts are still the basic immigration law of the United States. In spite of amendment since their enactment they have remained substantially unchanged from their original form. Their provisions with respect to exclusion, deportation and quota immigration are summarized below. A chronological list of subsequent legislation with respect to these three aspects of immigration law is also given in order to bring the summary up to date and to show the course of more recent legislation.²

Exclusion. By the original immigration act of 1882 it was required that "any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge . . . shall not be permitted to land." Succeeding acts have departed somewhat from this phrasing, but have reaffirmed the excludability of such aliens and have added to the list of excludable classes. The following classes of immigrant aliens are now excludable.

A. EXCLUDABLE CLASSES OF IMMIGRANT ALIENS³ (Sec. 3, Immigration Act of 1917⁴ except as noted)

1. Idiots
2. Imbeciles

² The full detail of immigration law with respect to quota provisions and the excludable and deportable classes of aliens can not be given in the following brief summary. For the complete text of immigration law see United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service: *IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS AND REGULATIONS*. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1944. (Supplement I, 1945; Supplement II, 1946.)

³ The excludability of non-immigrant aliens (such as temporary visitors, returning resident aliens, etc.) is not identical with that of immigrant aliens.

⁴ 39 Stat. 875-878.

3. Insane persons
4. Persons who have been convicted of or admit having committed a felony or other crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude
5. Contract laborers
6. Persons likely to become public charges
7. Paupers
8. Persons afflicted with tuberculosis in any form or with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease
9. Polygamist, or persons who practice polygamy or believe in or advocate the practice of polygamy
10. Persons who have come in consequence of advertisements for laborers
11. Persons whose ticket or passage is paid for with the money of another, etc.
12. Epileptics
13. Persons who have had one or more attacks of insanity at any time previous
14. Professional beggars
15. Persons who disbelieve in or are opposed to organized government, etc.
16. Persons who are members of or affiliated with any organization entertaining or teaching disbelief in or opposition to organized government, etc.
17. Prostitutes, etc.
18. Persons who directly or indirectly procure or attempt to procure or import prostitutes, etc.
19. Persons who are supported by or receive in full or in part proceeds from prostitution
20. Feeble minded persons
21. Persons certified by the examining physician as being mentally or physically defective, such physical defect being of a nature which may affect ability to earn a living
22. All children under 16 years of age, unaccompanied by one or both parents (with exceptions)
23. Persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority
24. Persons with chronic alcoholism
25. Vagrants
26. Persons who have been excluded from admission and

deported in pursuance of law, and who again seek admission within one year, etc.

27. Stowaways

28. Natives of the so-called Asiatic barred zone

Exceptions: missionaries civil engineers teachers
 students lawyers chemists
 merchants physicians authors
 government officers artists
 ministers or religious teachers
 travellers for curiosity or pleasure
 legal wives of the above or their children
 under 16 years of age

29. Aliens over 16 years of age, physically capable of reading, who cannot read the English language, or some other language or dialect, including Hebrew or Yiddish

Exceptions: (a) the father or grandfather over 55 years of age, the wife, the mother, the grandmother, or the unmarried or widowed daughter of any admissible alien, or of any citizen of the United States

(b) any alien seeking admission to the United States in order to avoid religious persecution

(c) aliens who have been lawfully admitted and have five years of continuous residence, and who are returning within six months of the date of their departure

30. Otherwise admissible aliens who are accompanying and are essential for the protection of an excluded alien, provided that the excluded alien is certified as being helpless from sickness, mental or physical disability, or infancy

31. Anarchists and similar classes. Acts of October 16, 1918; July 5, 1920; June 28, 1940

32. Aliens previously deported under the Act of May 10, 1920 (subversive and other classes). Act of May 10, 1920

33. Aliens ineligible to citizenship

Exceptions: (a) certain classes of aliens admissible as nonquota immigrants

(b) the wife or the unmarried child under eighteen years of age of certain classes of aliens admissible as nonquota immigrants

(c) the Chinese wife of an American citizen who was married prior to May 26, 1924
Acts of May 26, 1924; June 13, 1930

34. Aliens with improper, fraudulent, or no documents, or whose status under immigration law is not as reported on the immigration visa. Acts of May 26, 1924; March 24, 1934; May 14, 1937; June 28, 1940

35. Aliens seeking to enter from foreign contiguous territory brought to such territory by a transportation company not complying with the requirements of the Immigration Act of 1924, unless the alien has resided in such territory more than two years.
Act of May 26, 1924

36. Any alien previously arrested and deported from the United States, unless permission has been granted for application for admission. Act of March 4, 1929

37. Aliens who have fallen into distress or needed public aid from causes arising subsequent to their entry and who have been voluntarily removed from the United States at public expense.
Act of May 14, 1937

38. Persons who have departed from the United States to avoid military service in wartime or during a period of national emergency. Act of September 27, 1944

Additional restrictions on the admission of aliens to the United States apply in times of war or national emergency.⁵

Deportation after Entry. Early in the history of Federal immigration legislation it was found necessary to reinforce the exclusion requirements with provision for deportation after entry. The 1882 act had merely directed the return of "foreign convicts except those convicted of political offenses . . . to the countries from whence they came." In 1888, however, the amendment of October 19 to the Act of February 23, 1887⁶ initiated a new policy of deportation of illegal entrants, limited to within one year after entry.

The Immigration Act of 1891 reaffirmed the deportability of illegal entrants within one year after entry, and further pro-

⁵ Acts of May 22, 1918; June 21, 1941.

⁶ 23 Stat. 332; 25 Stat. 567.

vided for the deportation of "any alien who becomes a public charge within one year after his arrival in the United States from causes existing prior to his landing therein." The number of deportable classes of aliens has grown since then to include the following.

B. CLASSES OF ALIENS DEPORTABLE AFTER ENTRY
(Sec. 19, Immigration Act of 1917⁷ except as noted)

Deportable for Causes existing at Time of Entry:

1. Any alien who at time of entry was a member of one or more of the classes excluded by law (*see* list of excludable classes above)
2. Any alien who enters in violation of law
3. Any alien who, after being excluded or arrested and deported as a prostitute, or as a procurer, etc., reenters the United States
4. Any alien who was convicted or who admits the commission prior to entry of a crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude
5. Any alien who enters without inspection
6. Anarchists and similar classes. Acts of October 16, 1918; June 28, 1940
7. Any alien who obtains an immigration visa through fraud by contracting marriage solely for that purpose. Act of May 14, 1937

Deportable for Causes Arising After Entry:

8. Any alien found advocating anarchy
9. Any alien who within five years after entry becomes a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to landing
10. Any alien sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of commission in the United States of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry, or any alien sentenced more than once for such term of imprisonment at any time after entry
11. Any alien engaged in or connected with the practice of prostitution, etc.

⁷ 39 Stat. 889-890.

12. Any alien who shall import or attempt to import any persons for the purpose of prostitution
13. Aliens convicted of violation of certain wartime and neutrality acts or interned during wartime. Act of May 10, 1920
14. Any alien violating his status or terms of admission. Acts of May 26, 1924; April 29, 1943; February 14, 1944
15. Any alien convicted of violation of any law regulating traffic in narcotics. Acts of February 18, 1931; June 28, 1940
16. Any alien who at any time within five years after entry shall have aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law, etc. Act of June 28, 1940 (Alien Registration Act)
17. Any alien who shall have, on more than one occasion, aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law, etc. Act of June 28, 1940
18. Any alien convicted of possessing or carrying certain weapons in violation of law. Act of June 28, 1940
19. Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of violating certain provisions of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 (concerning fraudulent registration), or any alien who shall have been convicted at any time of more than one such violation. Act of June 28, 1940

Control of Immigration by Quota. The provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924, with amendments, for the control of immigration by means of the national origins quota system are summarized below under three topics: the national origins quota formula, the nonquota classes that are exempt from quota limitation of the number to be admitted, and preference under the quota law.

C. QUOTA PROVISIONS

(Immigration Act of 1924⁸ except as noted)

National Origins Quota Formula:

"The annual quota of any nationality . . . shall be a number which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 having that national origin bears to the number of inhabitants in continental United

⁸ 43 Stat. 153.

States in 1920, but the minimum quota of any nationality shall be 100."

Nonquota Classes:

1. The unmarried child under 21 years of age or the wife of a citizen of the United States, provided that the marriage shall have occurred prior to issuance of visas (as amended by the Acts of May 29, 1928; July 11, 1932)
2. An immigrant previously lawfully admitted to the United States, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad
3. An immigrant born in the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Republic of Mexico, the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent country of Central or South America, or his wife, and his unmarried children under 18 years of age
4. An immigrant who continuously for at least two years immediately preceding the time of his application for admission to the United States has been, and who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose of, carrying on the vocation of minister of any religious denomination, or professor . . . ; and his wife, and his unmarried children under 18 years of age
5. An immigrant born in the United States who has lost his United States citizenship and is a citizen or subject of a nonquota country, or is not a citizen or subject of any country but is coming from a nonquota country
6. The husband of a citizen of the United States, provided that the marriage occurred prior to July 1, 1932. Acts of May 29, 1928; July 11, 1932
7. A woman who was a citizen of the United States and lost her citizenship by marriage to an alien, or by loss of United States citizenship by her husband, or by marriage to an alien and residence in a foreign country. Acts of May 29, 1928; July 3, 1930
8. A former citizen of the United States who is also a national of a foreign state and who has lost his citizenship in the United States by entering or serving in the armed forces of a foreign state. Act of October 14, 1940
9. A former citizen of the United States, expatriated through the expatriation of a parent or parents; provided that he has not acquired the nationality of another country by any affirmative

act and that he comes to the United States before reaching the age of 25. Act of October 14, 1940

Quota Preference:

10. Quota immigrants who are the fathers or mothers of citizens of the United States who are 21 years of age or over

11. Husbands of citizens of the United States by marriages occurring on or after July 1, 1932 (as amended by Act of July 11, 1932)

12. Quota immigrants who are skilled in agriculture, together with their wives and children under 18 years of age (limited to nationalities whose quota is 300 or more per annum)

13. Quota immigrants who are the unmarried children under 21 years of age, or the wives, of lawfully admitted alien residents of the United States

14. Under the Chinese quota a preference up to 75 per cent of the quota is given to Chinese who are born and resident in China. Act of December 17, 1943

15. Under the quota for races indigenous to India a preference up to 75 per cent of the quota is given to persons born and resident in India or its dependencies. Act of July 2, 1946

Wartime Legislation. The second world war brought little change in the immigration laws and policies of the United States. The legislation remaining on the statute books from the time of the preceding war, together with earlier legislation, was adequate to meet most wartime needs. Immigration was at a low ebb during the war, and the quota act gave assurance that there could not be any large-scale immigration after the war. Furthermore, the wartime powers of the executive were sufficient to meet all special needs, such as for wartime travel regulation and for the control of enemy aliens. In large measure, such special wartime needs were met by presidential proclamation, executive order, and administrative regulation.

There is further reason why little special legislation was needed during the war. In spite of the apparent minuteness with which the controls on immigration are set by Congress, there nevertheless remains within the control mechanism a rather wide range of administrative discretion. Because of this

discretion there is in fact a considerable flexibility in the application of the immigration laws. The flexibility arises in part from a direct granting of discretionary powers to administrative officers. Flexibility also arises from the occasional use in the immigration laws of general phrases such as "likely to become a public charge," "endanger the public safety," and "moral turpitude" which permit some latitude of interpretation.

Whatever the reasons, immigration laws changed relatively little during the recent war years. The changes that took place with respect to exclusion, deportation, and quota controls are listed above. Only three wartime measures deserve special mention as involving significant developments in immigration law and policy. These are:

1. The Alien Registration Act of 1940;
2. The measures authorizing and facilitating the temporary admission of laborers;
3. The Act of December 17, 1943, repealing the Chinese exclusion acts.

The Alien Registration Act, enacted more than a year before the entry of the United States into the war and at a time when fears of fifth column activities were high, was designed to provide the government with additional powers to suppress subversive activities and to undertake the surveillance of aliens. The Act defined certain activities as subversive, provided penalties for such activities, and authorized the deportation of certain subversive classes. The Act also required the registration and fingerprinting of all aliens 14 years of age and over who remained in the United States for thirty days or longer, and of all aliens entering the United States.

A second wartime development was the temporary admission of agricultural laborers, railroad track workers, and others from Western Hemisphere countries. Authority for such admission was found in the fourth and ninth provisos of section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917.⁹ Explicit authorization was provided

⁹ Waiver of the contract labor laws for the admission of skilled labor if labor of
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by the Joint Resolution of April 29, 1943, amended and extended by the Joint Resolutions of December 23, 1943, and February 14, 1944. A similar relaxation of the immigration laws on a temporary basis in order to meet labor shortages in the United States was made during the first world war.

A third wartime measure and a notable reversal of immigration law and policy was the repeal of the Chinese exclusion acts. Eligibility for naturalization, and thereby for permanent admission to the United States,¹⁰ had been limited to "white persons, persons of African nativity or descent, and descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere."¹¹ Members of the Chinese race had been specifically excluded as immigrants since 1882. Early in the war, however, the repeal of Chinese exclusion came to be strongly urged in justice to an ally and in answer to enemy propaganda. By the Act of December 17, 1943, the Chinese exclusion acts were repealed, members of the Chinese race were made eligible to naturalization in the United States, and were given an immigration quota of 105 per annum under the national origins quota formula.

Recently Proposed Legislation. The first world war period marked a turning point in the immigration policy of the United States. Up to that time the trend of policy had been toward an increasingly careful and rigorous selection of immigrants. That trend continues, but with the quota acts of the early 1920's qualitative selection was supplemented by numerical limitations covering most but not quite all potential immigrants (*see* nonquota classes above).

The debate on questions of immigration policy has continued since that time, but the two basic principles of present immigration policy appear to be firmly fixed. These are, *first*, a careful selection of immigrants, and *second*, a limitation of the number to be admitted. There is at the present time no pros-

like kind unemployed is not to be found in the United States; and authorization of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, with approval of the Attorney General, to issue rules and prescribed conditions for the temporary admission of otherwise inadmissible aliens.

¹⁰ See excludable class 33 above.

¹¹ Section 303, Nationality Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 1140).

pect of any departure from these two principles of control. The possibility of modification within the framework of selection plus restriction remains, however. The discussion of immigration policy has continued in Congress and elsewhere and there have been many proposals for new immigration legislation. Since Congressional bills afford perhaps the best indication of the trend of views with respect to immigration policy, it is useful as a guide to contemporary trends of policy to look at the immigration bills that have been introduced in Congress in recent years.

Special immigration problems arising out of the war have been the subject of a number of recent bills in the 79th Congress. Prominent among them are the following three types of bill.

1. There have been a number of bills to facilitate the immigration of alien wives and husbands of members of the armed services. Legislation to this effect has already been passed in the Act of December 28, 1945. Similar action with respect to fiancees of members of the armed services has been taken.¹²
2. Several bills to facilitate the entry as immigrants of displaced persons have been introduced, to supplement the measures already taken under presidential directive of December 22, 1945.¹³
3. Other bills introduced in the recent session of Congress would bar nationals of former enemy countries from the United States, especially those who bore arms against the United States or who were members of certain totalitarian organizations.¹⁴

Other proposals for legislation have dealt with more fundamental questions of immigration policy. During the recent war years two modifications of immigration policy were most widely recommended. One was for liberalization of the immigration laws in order to eliminate elements of racial discrimination inconsistent with our declarations of national objectives. The

¹² Act of June 29, 1946.

¹³ For example, H. R. 7218 (Klein); H. R. 7213 (Woodhouse); H. J. Res. 363 (Luce).

¹⁴ H. R. 6869 (Gossett); H. R. 3773 (Izac); H. R. 3663 (Gossett).

other was for further restriction of immigration, with wartime emergencies and postwar reconversion problems cited as reasons for such action. Proposals of the same character have continued to appear after the war.

A number of bills to permit the immigration and naturalization of members of races now excluded and ineligible for citizenship have been introduced in the recent sessions of Congress. At least sixteen such bills in favor of natives of India were introduced in the 79th Congress. By the Act of July 2, 1946, Filipinos and members of races indigenous to India were made eligible for admission and naturalization. Minimum quotas of 100 per annum were assigned to both peoples under the national origins quota formula. Five or more bills of similar intent with respect to Koreans were also introduced in the recent session of Congress.

Another very considerable group of bills is made up of those calling for drastic and general reductions in immigration quotas. Some of the bills call for a percentage reduction or a complete suspension of immigration for a specified period, such as for five years after the war.¹⁵ Others would make a suspension of immigration mandatory whenever the number of unemployed in the United States exceeds a specified figure, usually set at 1,000,000 but sometimes put as low as 100,000.¹⁶ Action on these bills in the 79th Congress was forestalled by the hearings on immigration questions conducted under House Resolution 52, but similar bills undoubtedly will be introduced in the next Congress.

¹⁵ Including S. 1758 (Maybank); H. R. 414 (Gossett).

¹⁶ For example, H. R. 3286 (Rankin); S. 1020 (Stewart); S. 240 (Stewart).

THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF LARGER IMMIGRATION

WARREN S. THOMPSON¹

THE purely demographic implications of immigration are not difficult to state with fair assurance, provided a few simple assumptions are made regarding the numbers and the types of immigrants. In calculations of the prospective population of the United States made by the Scripps Foundation, it was found that a net immigration of approximately 100,000 annually between 1945 and 1970 would add about 3 million persons to our population at the latter date. This number would vary somewhat depending on the birth rates and death rates assumed, but for our thinking here the round number is sufficient. Hence, assuming that present quotas, amounting to approximately 153,000, were filled each year, and that there were no nonquota immigrants, the total increase in our population through immigration by 1970 would be somewhat over 4.5 millions. The assumption in these calculations most likely to throw them off is that the birth rate of the immigrants will remain somewhat above that of the natives during this time, although steadily and gradually approaching the latter. To the writer, this seems a reasonable assumption. Others may hold a different view.

The general trends of birth rates and death rates in our present population which are assumed in these calculations are no longer questioned although there is quite naturally some difference of opinion as to the exact course this trend will follow over the next two or three decades in spite of, perhaps because of, the higher crude birth rates which have prevailed since about 1941. If these higher birth rates should continue for some years they would, of course, result in a more rapid growth in both our native and immigrant populations than that shown by these calculations. My own opinion is that this is unlikely to happen. Moreover, if substantial dif-

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ferences in age-specific death rates from those now prevailing were to develop, they would affect the age composition of the population even though they probably would not greatly affect total numbers. As an example of such a change one may cite the relatively high death rates of young male adults in France, which do reduce the labor and military force of the French nation as compared with Great Britain and other European countries.

It seems clear from what has been said that we can, in spite of certain practical difficulties, foresee the quantitative effects of a given amount of immigration within useful limits. If the filling of our present quotas would increase our total population by around 4.5 millions by 1970, the effect of any multiple or fraction of this number on our growth can be readily calculated. Any significant variations from this simple calculation would probably arise from changes in the types of our immigrants and would result largely from changes which would affect the birth rate rather than the death rate. It will be well, therefore, to examine briefly the possible character of these changes in types of immigrants.

In the past, a large part of our immigrants have come from the peasants in countries where their birth rate was relatively high. The most important urban group of immigrants was the Jewish group which came from the poorer city populations in countries where the birth rate of this class was also high. For these reasons the birth rate of our foreign born, even those from cities, has generally been higher than that for the natives as a whole, although no higher than in some of our own rural areas. If there should be a marked change in the source of our immigrants so that they came from lower birth rate groups, their rate of growth from excess of births over deaths would be lowered. Thus, if the ruin of European cities and the persecution of the Jews should result in a significant increase in the proportion of urban people from western and central Europe among our immigrants, one would expect them to have a lower birth rate than our earlier immigrants, and quite possibly lower

than the average of the countries from which they would come. They might even have a lower birth rate than our native urban population, although this is not probable. If such a change in the source of our immigrants should take place, the entrance of about 153,000 annually between now and 1970 would probably not result in as large an increase as calculated. The difference, however, would be unlikely to amount to more than a few hundreds of thousands. On the other hand, the predominance of peasants from southern and southeastern Europe in our immigration would probably raise the number they would add to our population somewhat above the figures given.

Again, if the number of immigrants should be two or three times as large as present quotas, it is reasonably certain that they will form rather solid colonies in our cities and will retain their higher birth rates longer than if they are but few in numbers and are scattered more evenly through the present population of the cities. Thus the immigration policy we follow will in large measure determine not only the number of immigrants admitted, but the size of their families and hence their total addition to our population over the next generation.

The probable effects of a fairly large amount of immigration on the composition of our population are also relatively easy to state in general terms. It is probable that young people will continue to predominate and that the number of males will considerably exceed that of females. A fairly large immigration, let us say two or three times present quotas, would, therefore, tend to retard somewhat the rather rapid aging of our population and would also tend to maintain our present excess of males or possibly to increase it. The sudden and rather complete stoppage of immigration such as we experienced during World War I, the restriction of numbers after the first quota law, and the almost complete stoppage during the depression of the 1930's are important factors in the rather rapid age and sex changes which have taken place since 1930, although the decline in the birth rates and the increase in the expectation of life are probably more important. The mere fulfillment of our

present quotas will hardly have a significant effect on our future age and sex composition.

Under our present law the great majority of quota immigrants must come from northern, western, and central Europe. (There is no quota restriction on immigrants from countries in the Western Hemisphere.) These European sources of immigration have long been drying up, largely because the populations in these regions are rapidly approaching a stationary condition, and also because these countries, too, have been changing rapidly in industrial structure. Whether the destruction wrought by the war over much of Europe will start a new stream of migration from these areas no one can tell. It is my personal opinion that, while there might be enough people from western European countries to fill their quotas for a few years, the majority of persons in any large immigration, *i.e.*, in an immigration amounting to two or three times the total of present quotas and continuing for two or three decades, must come from the peasant peoples of southern and southeastern Europe.

As a practical matter, therefore, it seems to me useless to talk of larger immigration unless we are ready to abandon the present basis for calculating quotas. If we want immigrants, or if we feel it a duty to take the displaced and distressed peoples of Europe, we must admit much larger proportions of Jews and of Slavs and Italians from southern and southeastern Europe than is possible at present. It is doubtful at the moment, of course, whether the Balkans and Poland, which were sending us large numbers of immigrants from about 1900 until the adoption of the present quotas, will allow much emigration in the near future, and the total number of Jews outside of the Soviet Union has been reduced to perhaps one-eighth or one-tenth of their pre-war numbers. The admission of all the Jews now living in Europe, outside the Soviet Union, probably would not fill our present quotas for more than a few years.

It would seem likely, however, that once the immediate stunning effects of the war are past a large number of Germans

might want to migrate. Whether we will admit any considerable number of them in the near future seems highly doubtful, but this attitude may change after a time, so that not only present German quotas but increased quotas will be allowed. It would appear, then, that only southern and southeastern Europe have rather large and prolific peasant populations from which we could expect any considerable number of immigrants from that continent, year after year, beginning in the near future. If this is the case it follows that any considerable European immigration during the next twenty-five years is bound to produce significant changes in the national origins of our population. The peoples who came to us before 1900 are no longer "swarming" and we cannot yet be certain that the war has so changed their conditions of life that we can secure any large number of them unless we adopt a definite policy of encouragement quite different from anything we have done in the past and unless this meets no obstacle in their home lands. Our choice as regards European immigration seems to me to lie between a mere trickle from northern, western, and central Europe or a larger number, how large cannot now be foreseen, from southern and southeastern Europe.

If we should have any considerable number of immigrants in the near future, I see no reason to believe that they will be distributed in this country much differently from those that entered after about 1900. We have as yet shown no recognition of a need to change our present pattern of population distribution and immigrants would of necessity fit themselves to this pattern. This means that they will continue to concentrate in our larger cities in the Northeast and along the Great Lakes, thus adding to the concentration of population in the areas already most densely settled. Only a very determined effort at planned distribution could prevent this. Whether this distribution is considered satisfactory will depend almost entirely upon the values one attaches to different modes of living and, at the moment, on his judgment of the seriousness of the atomic threat to our present urban civilization.

If we assume that future immigrants will live in our larger cities, we can also predict with fair accuracy the parts of these cities in which they will settle. As in the past they will constitute a considerable proportion of the lowest income group and will live largely in the "blighted" areas, for some years, at least. Their families will be raised in neighborhoods which are now known as the breeding spots of dependency, delinquency, and poor health. Moreover, their families will be above the average size for the city so that an undue proportion of the children of these cities will come from sub-standard areas and will have, at the best, very poor training for responsible citizenship. Only carefully planned settlement will change these conditions and give the children of immigrants a fair opportunity to develop normally.

THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

The economic effects of a large amount of immigration have always been matters of keen dispute. There has never been even a semblance of agreement among students regarding the effects of large numbers of immigrants on wages, on the ability of labor to organize, on the rate of expansion of our industry, or on the attainment of an economic optimum population, to mention only a few of the more important problems. As long as a large proportion of our immigration went to the rural areas and became farmers, many of them taking homesteads of their own, there was comparatively little objection to them from the standpoint of their influence on our economy or on our social development. However, when they began to settle in the cities in large numbers and came into direct competition with the natives, antagonism grew rapidly and many people, particularly the city workers, began to feel that large numbers of immigrants had an adverse effect on wages, on labor solidarity, on the establishment of minimum standards of safety in work, etc., as well as upon the social standards approved by the natives. Our quota laws seem to me to prove the growth of these attitudes towards immigrants.

But these attitudes towards immigrants are by no means of recent origin. More than a century ago the settlement of rather large numbers of certain groups of immigrants in our eastern cities caused urban workmen to begin to ask whether keeping the United States "a haven of refuge for the oppressed of all lands" was not reducing their own levels of living. "Know-nothingism" represented one of these early reactions against the "foreigner" in our midst. In the opinion of the writer this "anti-foreign" attitude, which has frequently cropped up ever since our immigration became relatively large in the 1820's, had its origin chiefly in the belief that the economic position of the native worker was worsened by the presence of a large number of foreigners who were willing to take relatively low wages and who lived at a low level on the "other side of the tracks."

Although I have never been convinced that the presence of large numbers of immigrants lowered the wages of the native worker, or even kept wages from rising as fast as they otherwise would have risen, there is no doubt whatever that this belief has long been widely held and that it has had a very considerable influence in determining the attitudes of a large part of our people towards immigrants; nor is there much doubt that it will again become an important factor in determining policy if the increase and change of quotas comes up for serious consideration. This belief in the economic disadvantages of immigration also aggravated the problems of social and economic adjustment which all foreigners have to face in a strange land.

However, as long as our economy was expanding rapidly, and particularly as long as there was a relative abundance of new land, it was only at times of depression that the native and the immigrant of "older" stock came into irritating competition with the new immigrant. During most of the century 1820-1920 the native in the city was able to find a more desirable job at better pay when the immigrant crowded him in his job. Largely because of his greater familiarity with the

opportunities for advancement which were continually opening up, and because of his superior training he was able to move up the economic ladder. In the opening up of new land the native also had the advantage in that he "knew the ropes" better than the immigrant. Moreover, in the rural community the effects of competition between immigrant and native were not so readily discernible; or, perhaps one should say, it was less easy to assume a simple causal connection between immigrants and low wages for the native.

In periods of depression, on the other hand, when wages fell and when unemployment was high it was naturally assumed by the native that if it were not for the foreigner he would be better off even though it could never be proved that the proportion of unemployed natives was significantly affected by the presence of large numbers of immigrants.

I see no way in which we can determine with any assurance what have been the effects of large numbers of immigrants on the wages and incomes of the natives. But, as a social scientist, I am suspicious of explanations which find a simple direct causal connection between such a complex situation as is created by a large immigration and the incomes of native workmen. In social situations causal relations are not generally so simple. I am hesitant to believe that the income of the native worker has, on the whole, been adversely affected by the presence of large numbers of immigrants. I find it no more difficult to believe that the presence of some millions of immigrants in our population during the last century has hastened our urban and industrial development and has thus been a factor of importance in increasing the rate of expansion as well as the efficiency of our economy. It seems to me that it is not fantastic to argue that if there had been no poorly-paid substratum of "foreigners" to crowd them out of the heavy and dirty jobs at the bottom the natives would not have got ahead as fast as they did. Of course, such a thesis can never be proved by the facts available but personally I find no more difficulty in believing this than in believing that the presence of large numbers

of immigrants has always been detrimental to the economic interests of the native or of the nation as a whole.

Still another point which deserves consideration in connection with the effect of large numbers of immigrants on the incomes of natives is that the immigrants have contributed substantially to the relatively high rate of increase of our population in the past. The rapid growth of our population, when considered in relation to our large natural resources, has almost certainly been a contributing factor of some importance in keeping our entire economy expanding at a rapid rate and in stimulating our ingenuity to more efficient production. I am not saying that this rapid growth of population was the major factor in creating our dynamic economic system, but I am asking whether the huge growth of home markets in a rapidly growing population was not a strong stimulant to increasing efficiency in our economic system through the development of the mass-production industries. I know that no satisfactory answer can be given such a question, but as long as there is a reasonable probability that a rapidly growing population was a significant economic stimulant, the role of the immigrant in increasing our population should not be ignored when considering the effect of immigration on the incomes of natives.

A second point mentioned above dealt with the effect of a large number of immigrants on the ability of labor to organize. On this point there seems to me little reason to doubt that the organization of labor in this country has been retarded and perhaps given a somewhat different direction by the presence of large groups of immigrants. The differences in language, in levels of living, in religion, and in amenability to authority, as well as the partial segregation of different nationalities in different parts of the community, interposed many obstacles to unionization which would not have been as serious in a more homogeneous population. This is especially true when, as was the case and as probably would be in the future if we had any considerable number of immigrants of different nationalities, the immigrants bring with them many Old World prejudices

and hatreds. That Serbs and Croats would be suspicious of overtures from Hungarians and Austrian-Germans regarding organizing a union in a steel mill is not in the least surprising. The former had been oppressed by the latter in Europe, and it was not to be expected that mere movement to America would eradicate these suspicions and old hatreds. In a hundred ways the attitudes of immigrants towards cooperation in labor organizations with their fellow workers, both foreign and native, were colored by their European backgrounds and prejudices which thus exercised a retarding effect on the organization of labor in the mass-production industries and in the unskilled occupations in which most immigrants found their first jobs. I would not for a moment argue that this was the only retarding factor making labor organization more difficult in this country than in England, for example. I would not even argue that it was the principal factor, but only that it was important and should not be overlooked in trying to evaluate the influence of immigration on the labor movement in the past and its probable effects in the future if we should again have a larger immigration.

Another possible effect of a large number of immigrant workers on our economy relates to the rate of accumulation of capital made possible by their relatively low wages. Certainly, before World War I, we were always in need of more capital as shown by our foreign borrowings at relatively high interest rates. If the low wages of immigrants made possible the more rapid accumulation of capital in the hands of "the captains of industry" than would otherwise have taken place, it would at least be open to question whether this had not been a significant factor in the rapid expansion of industry and commerce referred to above and, therefore, in raising the general level of living at the extremely rapid pace which has prevailed for some decades. But, of course, even if this has been the case in the past, it by no means follows that it will be in the future. We now seem to have an abundance, perhaps a superabundance, of domestic capital.

On the other hand, it is a commonly accepted doctrine that the cheaper labor is, the less incentive there is to invest large amounts of capital in new and more efficient machines which will increase the productive capacity of labor. This is probably true as a general principle where competition with other business units is not too keen. But I have often wondered whether there is not some confusion in discussions as to what constitutes cheap labor. Labor might be thought of as cheap when the hourly wage is low as was often the case with immigrants. However, it is only really cheap when the cost per unit of product is low. When all employers have access to a labor supply at about the same hourly rates it would seem that active competition would lead them to adopt new and better machinery wherever it would reduce the cost of production, no matter what the hourly wage rate may be. The rapid accumulation of capital in the hands of competitive enterprisers may, therefore, have been an important factor in increasing the efficiency of our industry and in so far as the immigrant contributed to this rapid accumulation by accepting relatively low wages he may have hastened the rise in our general level of living. Certainly the United States cannot be said to have lagged in the use of more and better machinery even though we have had a relative abundance of immigrant labor most of the time for the last century.

Another point of much interest in the economics of immigration is the effect of immigration on the economic optimum population. As a basis for what little I wish to say here on this matter, I shall assume that there is such an optimum. At any given moment the economic optimum population depends upon the natural resources available, the state of scientific achievement, the level of technological development, the training of the workers, and the current pattern of business organization. Personally, I have never found any one who claimed to know what the economic optimum population was for any country or area, although many people are convinced that particular countries have reached or passed this optimum. But if the idea

of an economic optimum population is sound, it seems clear that if the United States, to make the matter concrete, has passed the economic optimum, the factors which helped to produce this situation and those which might encourage still further growth of population have retarded and would continue to retard the rise of our level of living. The line of argument supporting this conclusion is to the effect that in order to provide for the excess of population above the economic optimum, poorer land must be cropped than would otherwise be necessary, lower grade and less accessible ores must be mined, more elaborate transportation facilities must be set up for the interchange of products, both domestic and foreign, which would not otherwise be used and exchanged, and a more complicated and costly economic structure must be operated in order to provide jobs for this excess of population, none of which would be needed if we had only the economic optimum. If, therefore, the United States has already passed this economic optimum, further immigration by raising the uneconomic excess of population still higher will continue to retard the rise of the level of living. In these circumstances it seems only economic common sense to regard as undesirable any growth of population beyond the economic optimum.

In judging of the probable economic effects of immigration by reason of its effects on the economic optimum population, I find myself at variance with many people who discuss it on two points: (a) as to whether the United States has already passed the economic optimum; and (b) as to the probable rate at which any increase in population above the economic optimum will reduce the level of living below what it would be at the optimum.

It must be recognized that any statement made here is purely theoretical because there are no facts showing what the economic optimum population would be under any given set of conditions as regards resources, scientific achievement, technological development, or the organization of the economic system. When we come to consider (a) *viz.*, whether we have

already passed the economic optimum for the population of the United States, I find myself disposed to place this economic optimum higher than most students of the problem. I think it likely that the lower level of productivity in the extractive industries—chiefly agriculture and mining—resulting from the exploitation of lower-grade resources, made necessary because we have 140 million people rather than only 75 or 100 million, may be compensated for by the greater efficiency of the mass-production industries which are dependent upon the vast markets which can only be found in a large population, particularly if production is to profit by active competition between large units. I find myself continually asking whether the high and increasing technological efficiency of many parts of our economy is not in part a function of active competition in a large population having a high level of living, granting, of course, the presence of basic natural resources in given amounts and qualities. I recognize that there may be conditions in which a population much smaller than our present population might enjoy all the advantages of a highly efficient industry, but I am very doubtful that it can do so and still keep its economic system competitive. I also recognize that an increase in, or even a given level of, per capita production cannot continue indefinitely with increasing numbers. But in the United States I am inclined to believe that the relatively large size of our population is, in part, a causal factor in creating our high technological efficiency and that one of the most dynamic elements in our economy might be seriously damaged by any rapid reduction of our rate of population growth. The absence of growth or the decline in numbers would be even a more severe blow.

This brings us then to the consideration of point (b), *viz.*, whether the difference in level of living possible with the economic optimum population and with the present and probable future population, is not small in comparison with the reduction in this level that would take place through the disruption of our economy if we undertook to reduce our population to

the economic optimum within a decade or two. I speak of reducing our population to the economic optimum, not because I am convinced we are already above the economic optimum, but because I believe that most of the people who express themselves on this point hold that we are. My personal belief is that the disruption of our economy by even a cessation of growth, to say nothing of an absolute reduction in numbers, which would be necessary to achieve an economic optimum considerably below our present numbers, would lessen our per capita productivity far more than any excess of population above the optimum now does. Hence, I am not as greatly worried by any increase in numbers which is likely to take place through future immigration as many people would be. This is only an opinion; but I hold it because, on balance, I believe that the adjustments to an economic optimum population substantially below our present numbers will be very painful if it is done quickly, and that for a generation or two at least we will all live better if we have a slowly growing population only gradually becoming stationary. Later, when we know better how to manage our economy, we may reduce our numbers to the economic optimum without producing harmful effects if this seems desirable. Since I do not believe that in the United States a given percentage of excess population above the economic optimum will lead to a proportional decline in level of living or that our present excess population, if excess there is, has significantly retarded improvement in our level of living. I am not at all certain that the increase of this excess by the immigration of a few hundred thousand annually will produce significant damage to our economic life in the next few decades.

What I have just said refers only to the United States although it may also apply in certain other countries which find themselves in much the same general economic situation. My attitude would be quite different if I were discussing the economics of immigration in more densely populated countries where natural resources are relatively smaller and where modern technological efficiencies are attained more slowly.

Finally, let me say that I have no expectation that the most reasonable demographic or economic considerations will be decisive in determining our future immigration policies. At best, these considerations will be of secondary importance. The commonly accepted beliefs regarding the economic effects of immigration, the practical considerations of politics, and the evaluation of our position in the world military situation will undoubtedly be decisive in determining our attitudes towards immigration in the future. This is probably inevitable in the present state of our economic education and of our development as citizens of the nation and of the world. Quite possibly it is also just as well from the standpoint of the welfare of mankind. More and more frequently I find myself asking: Is it more *reasonable* in the long run to follow the dictates of economic facts, when we can find them, or to make the compromises which political facts indicate to be essential if our relations with our fellow men both within and without the nation are to be moderately satisfying and peaceful? I have not answered this question to my own satisfaction, but I am less confident that I know the values by which what is *reasonable* should be determined than I was some years ago.

RECENT REFUGEE IMMIGRATION FROM EUROPE

MAURICE R. DAVIE¹

THE recent refugee movement to the United States aroused unusual interest because of its dramatic character, the type of people it involved, and the international unrest characterizing the period when it occurred. Composed primarily of middle and upper-class persons, it contrasted sharply with earlier immigration movements, and attracted the attention and sometimes the opposition of American professional and business people who hitherto had seldom if ever been directly concerned with immigrant arrivals as associates or as competitors. Since a majority of the refugees were either Jews by confession or "non-Aryans," that is, Jews by descent only, the movement provided a basis for anti-Semitic agitation, which was intensified by German propaganda. The refugees became the object of widespread discussion. On the one hand, they were hailed as a superior group greatly enriching American cultural and economic life, and, on the other hand, as a destructive and subversive element in our society.

What are the facts? How many of our recent immigrants have been refugees? To what nationalities and religious groups do they belong? How have our immigration laws functioned during this period, and how have they been administered? Where have the refugees settled? How have they adjusted themselves to American life? What contributions have they made to our culture and economy? In short, have they been an asset or a liability to this country?

It was in the attempt to answer these and similar questions in an objective and impartial way that the Study,² on which I am reporting, was undertaken. It was essentially a fact-finding investigation, carried out on a nation-wide scale through the cooperation of more than 200 agencies or committees lo-

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² Conducted by the Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from Europe and directed by the present author. The findings were published in March, 1947, by Harper and Brothers under the title of *REFUGEES IN AMERICA*.

cated in forty-one states and the District of Columbia. Among the original materials gathered were over 11,000 questionnaire returns from refugees in 638 communities in forty-four states and the District of Columbia (a rate of returns of about 33 per cent and representing a 5 per cent sample of the total number), 1,600 returns of a special questionnaire for refugee physicians and dentists (a rate of returns of 40 per cent and constituting a 30 per cent sample), over 200 life stories, over fifty reports on community backgrounds and attitudes, several hundred questionnaire returns on business enterprises established by refugees, and data obtained from interviews with representative refugees and Americans in various walks of life. The study covered the period from 1933, when the Nazis assumed power, to 1945.

A refugee may be defined as one who leaves his country of residence because of threat to life or liberty growing out of race, religion, or political belief. The refugee is thus an involuntary immigrant.

Since refugees are not designated as such in our official immigration records, resort must be had to an estimate of their number. The accepted procedure is to base this estimate on the number of arrivals, both "immigrant" and "non-immigrant," during certain years from Axis-occupied or Axis-dominated countries. During the period covered by the fiscal years ended from June 30, 1933, through 1944, we estimate that approximately 250,000 (243,862) refugees were admitted for permanent residence, and that approximately 200,000 (196,432) were admitted for temporary stay, and that of the latter only some 15,000 were still here at the close of the fiscal year on June 30, 1944.

The total immigration from Europe during this twelve-year period was 365,955, and that from all countries was 528,549. Thus the refugees constituted about two-thirds of the immigrants from Europe or one-half of the total number of immigrants.

The whole period, because of the depression and the war,

was one of very limited immigration, the smallest in any comparable period in the last hundred years. Only 16.8 per cent of Europe's quota was used for the entire period 1933-1944.

Some twenty nationalities were represented among the refugees. Half of them were Germans and Austrians. The other half included Poles, Czechs, Russians, Italians, Frenchmen, Hungarians, Netherlanders, Yugoslavs, and others. About two-thirds of the total were Jews (160,718 during 1933-1943). Among the non-Jewish refugees, there were more Protestants than Catholics, the ratio being approximately three to two. In a number of instances, the Christian refugees were married to Jews or were "non-Aryans" with one or more Jewish grandparents. It is noteworthy, in view of the alleged "flood" of Jewish immigrants, that the total number of Jews admitted from all countries during the entire span from 1933 through 1943 was equal to only about one-half the number of Jews admitted during the 1920's and about one-eighth the number admitted in the heyday of mass immigration from 1904 to 1914.

The refugees contrast sharply with other and earlier immigrants. They are essentially people who normally would not have emigrated but who left their homelands because of actual or anticipated persecution. In the days of mass immigration the unattached young male of the laborer, artisan, or servant class was typical. Recent immigrants, especially refugees, show a more even distribution of the sexes, a larger proportion of persons over 45 years of age, a larger proportion of married persons and hence of family groups, and a larger proportion of professional and business people, white-collar and skilled workers, and persons with no occupation. (The last-mentioned group, comprising well over one-half, consists mainly of housewives, children, and old people who have retired.)

Of those refugees who had engaged in business and industry before coming to this country, some 25,000 were merchants and dealers, about 5,500 agents, and 1,800 manufacturers. Physicians were the most numerous among those in the professions, numbering about 5,000. Other professional groups

included approximately 3,500 college professors and school teachers, 2,500 technical engineers, 2,400 clergymen, 1,900 scientists and literary men, 1,800 lawyers, 1,200 musicians, 800 actors, and 700 artists. Twelve were Nobel Prize winners, and at least 105 have attained the distinction of being listed in **Who's Who in AMERICA** and **222 in AMERICAN MEN OF SCIENCE**, despite the short time they have been here.

The distribution of refugees in the United States parallels that of the total foreign-born white population. In both instances, about three-fourths of the total reside in the eight states of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, and California. Questionnaire returns were received, you will recall, from forty-four states and the District of Columbia. The Study reveals that the distribution of the refugees has been largely determined by the location of their friends and relatives, job or school opportunities, and the resettlement program of the various service agencies. Refugees have settled mostly in the larger cities, although a good many live in small towns and rural areas. In no place do they constitute so much as one per cent of the population. The largest center is New York City, where they number well under 100,000. This wide distribution has occurred despite the fact that nearly nine-tenths of the refugees entered the country through the port of New York.

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

The problem of getting a job and earning a living in a new country is difficult enough for the ordinary immigrant. It is far more serious for the refugee, for a number of reasons. His very occupational background is a handicap, at least in the initial stage of adjustment. The unskilled worker can move with relative ease from a manual job in his homeland to a similar position here. The requirements of knowledge of English and of American conditions are minor in his case. Far different is the situation facing a businessman, a teacher, a physician, or a writer. The language difficulty is almost pro-

hibitive to immediate employment possibilities in their case. Moreover, the businessman must know American products and sales methods; the professional worker must learn the pattern of American professional life and practice; both need resources and connections such as come only in the course of time to established members of the community.

Despite these difficulties, the refugees have made an excellent economic adjustment. They have tended to follow the same type of occupation here they had engaged in abroad. Some two-thirds of those who are usually gainfully employed are engaged in professional, business management, or clerical occupations—a much higher proportion than is true of the total body of employed workers in the United States. Although at first many had to accept menial jobs, the great majority are now engaged in their former occupational field, but generally on a lower economic level. A comparison of occupation in Europe with occupation in the United States reveals that in the case of each occupational group (Edwards' socio-economic classification) the largest single percentage of workers remained in the same category they had been in abroad. This was particularly apparent in the case of professional persons and skilled and semi-skilled workers (the only instances of clear majority), which no doubt reflects the high degree of transferability of skills in these fields. There is much variation in this respect among professional workers—chemists, physicians, and musicians, for example, experiencing little difficulty in applying their skills here as they did abroad, while writers, architects, and lawyers encountered many obstacles. Besides the question of transferability of skill, other factors are involved, such as the demand for such services in this country, legal restrictions, the attitude of employers and of fellow workers or colleagues, the varying requirements as to adequacy of English and of knowledge of American methods, all of which vary widely between specific occupations.

At the time of the Study (extending from the fall of 1944 through the spring of 1945), 90 per cent of the refugees in the

labor force were employed. In view of the special difficulties faced by recent immigrants, this was a very favorable employment situation. To be sure, employment at this time was at an unusually high level because of the war demand, amounting in the case of native Americans to probably 95 per cent. (Unemployment rarely falls below 5 per cent of our working force, even in periods of prosperity.) But the refugees encountered restrictions due to alien status, especially since many of them had come from enemy countries, and the preference of employers for native workers. Other reasons for being unemployed included ill health, old age, family responsibility, and the inability to find "suitable" jobs.

Some three-fourths of the adult refugees were wholly dependent on their earnings, having no other source of income. The typical weekly wage was \$20-\$40 for women, and \$50-\$75 for men. Again, about three-fourths of the refugees had never since their arrival received financial assistance; presumably they either soon found employment, or had private funds, or both. At the time of the Study, only an insignificant percentage were being financially assisted, by friends or relatives or by service organizations. These were chiefly cases of old people, the sick, and broken families. It is significant that no refugee has had to be deported as a public charge.

Despite their proportional over-representation in certain occupational categories the refugees have been so relatively few in numbers and so widely distributed that they have caused no serious competition or dislocation. They have adapted themselves readily to American working conditions, bringing intelligence and willingness to perform any task. What little complaint there has been about them has referred not to matters of efficiency but rather to attitudes. Some of them have brought new skills or special knowledge which have contributed to the technical advance of our industry. Many refugee businessmen and industrialists are producing goods not previously manufactured here but imported from Europe, such as scientific instruments, precision tools, hand-made leather goods, and syn-

thetic products. Many are continuing here their old export trade to South America, Asia, and elsewhere. Many produced articles essential to the war effort. Instead of taking jobs away from Americans, they have given employment to a considerable number of Americans.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ADJUSTMENT

The social and cultural adjustment of refugees, as of any group of immigrants, involves learning the language, customs, and ways of the new country, establishing social relationships, participating in organized activities, and otherwise becoming integrated into the life of the community. This process is both individual and social. The age and sex of the individual and his family relationship are factors which bear on the degree of success with which he becomes socially adjusted.

Children, because they are still in the formative stage, have adjusted themselves most readily and have soon become practically indistinguishable from the native children. They have learned English rapidly, associated freely with other children, and presented no special problem. Their success in school has been remarkable. Refugee children recovered quite rapidly from the harrowing experiences abroad. Having few or no ties to the European background but merely recollections of an often unhappy childhood in Europe, they do not long for any other life, as their parents may. They cannot, therefore, think of their future apart from America.

With older people the problem is different. Refugees of advanced years have found it hard to make new friends, get used to new customs, and acquire a new language. Serious also, though to a lesser degree, are the problems of middle-aged refugees, for the most part persons who had established themselves in business or profession and in family and social relationships, and were substantial and respected members of the community and secure in their social status. The shock of emigration and transfer to a new setting where they had to begin all over again was more disturbing to them than to any

other age group. The trauma of forced emigration and of readjustment also caused serious strains on the refugee family. Among refugees it is *usual* to be separated, husband from wife, children from parents; it is *unusual* for a whole family to be together.

In spite of these difficulties, the degree of social and cultural adjustment of the refugees has been remarkable. They have become adjusted to a greater extent and in a shorter period of time than was the case with other immigrants of recent decades. This has been facilitated or promoted by their relatively small numbers, their wide distribution, their superior educational and cultural background, and their desire to become assimilated. Among the criteria of their satisfactory adjustment may be mentioned, in summary fashion, their tendency to live in American neighborhoods rather than immigrant colonies, to associate more with native Americans than with their own group or other recent immigrants, and to intermarry with native Americans to a greater extent than is usually the case with recently arrived foreign-born groups. It is safe to say that no other non-English speaking immigrant group has learned English so rapidly and so well in a comparable period of time. They read mainly English-language newspapers and English is the language commonly spoken in the home.

CITIZENSHIP AND LOYALTY

Of those eligible for citizenship by being over 21 years of age and resident in this country for five years or more, 82.7 per cent already have attained citizenship and the rest are in the process of doing so. They feel intense allegiance to this country and do not want to be known as refugees but as new Americans. To the refugees, most of whom had been deprived of their full rights as citizens in their homelands, and many of whom had been rendered stateless, the attainment of American citizenship is a matter of great moment. The event is often marked by celebrations and the exchange of gifts.

The refugees proved to be overwhelmingly loyal and aided

the war effort in every way. Eligible refugees, aliens and citizens alike, entered the Armed Forces to the same extent as native Americans. Many rendered special services because of their intimate knowledge of the languages, culture, psychology, economy, and geography of enemy countries. Those who did not serve in uniform contributed generously to the various war activities on the home front. A special type of war service was rendered by refugee scientists, scholars, industrialists, technicians, and other experts, including work on the atomic bomb.

The vast majority of the refugees in the United States, according to the Study, have no intention of returning to Europe. They are grateful for the freedom and opportunity that this country provides. Their hopes, especially for their children, are now centered here. The break with the past is definite and final. This was the reaction of 96.5 per cent of those who replied to the questionnaire. The extraordinarily high indication of permanency is characteristic of the refugee type of immigration, as has been evidenced throughout our history.

IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA

Through interviews, life stories, and replies to the questionnaires, the Study Committee gathered much material on the refugees' reaction to American life, the nature of which can only be suggested here. Having lived, especially the Germans, under authoritarian regimes and ruthlessness, they were impressed by the lack of regimentation here, and the absence of *Verboten* signs. They were amazed to discover that government officials were public servants instead of petty tyrants to be feared and distrusted. In their eyes the American people are distinguished by certain traits, of which generosity, friendliness, and helpfulness are outstanding. At the same time they found it difficult to get accustomed to the informality of Americans, the lack of distinctions in forms of address, and the free use of first names. They also found Americans over-active, lighthearted, optimistic. They consider the women better informed and less restricted in social life than their sisters

in Europe. On the other hand, they disapprove of the "exaggerated value of money as a measure of social prestige," the bally-hoo of American newspapers, the lack of thoroughness. The amount of racial and religious prejudice and discrimination appalled them because they had thought America free from such intolerance. Most of the refugees—about three-quarters—report, however, that they themselves had experienced no discrimination here.

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

The general reaction of Americans toward the refugee has been one of compassion for the victims of persecution seeking a haven here, and of appreciation of the contribution this superior group of immigrants is making to our country. On the other hand, there has been a certain amount of antagonism. Refugees have been looked upon as serious competitors, especially by certain professional and wage-earning groups and in certain communities. Much adverse propaganda, frequently circulated by American nationalist groups, has been directed at them. It was alleged, for example, during the depression that refugees were usurping the jobs of Americans. The total number of immigrants admitted in the 1930's, however, was so small that it could have but slight effect on unemployment. Moreover, the majority of them were not wage-earners but housewives, young children, and people too old to work; and some of the refugees, instead of taking jobs away from Americans, started new enterprises which increased employment opportunities.

Among professional groups, American physicians particularly have complained about the competition of refugee physicians. Yet their total number was only 3 per cent of the total number of physicians in America. Moreover, not all of them were practitioners. And not all of them succeeded in entering private practice because of barriers erected against them, such as the citizenship requirement for admission to a state-licensing examination or the restriction of licenses to the graduates of American or Canadian schools. Many refugee doctors settled

in small towns and rural areas previously lacking the services of a physician. As a matter of fact, the nation has been experiencing a dearth rather than a surplus of doctors.

Some of the wealthy refugees, a small percentage of the total group, have been criticized for engaging in speculation in real estate and in the stock market, a few taking advantage of our law which exempts "non-resident aliens" from the capital-gains tax. Most of them, however, have used their funds to establish manufacturing or other business enterprises or to invest in well-established American firms. They have had a stimulating effect on American business and have done much to develop our export trade.

A much more common complaint concerning refugees relates to certain of their personality traits and attitudes. It has frequently been complained, for example, that many of them have been arrogant, demanding, and class-conscious. The air of superiority of some, the habit of contrasting unfavorably their condition here with their former social and economic status in Europe, have irritated many Americans, including their well-wishers.

There is no doubt that these traits characterize certain individuals among the refugees as they do of any large group. In many instances, however, what is interpreted as arrogance is really compensation for the loss of status and for the indignities that many refugees have suffered. Some of it is merely characteristic of the behavior and attitudes in the countries from which they came. When peoples of different background are brought together a conflict of culture traits usually occurs. It tends to disappear as the immigrants learn and adopt the native practices.

From the countrywide standpoint, there has been little reaction favorable or unfavorable to the refugees. Except in a few large centers, the number is so small that unless undue attention is drawn to them the community as a whole is hardly aware of their presence. Most communities have no firsthand knowledge about the refugees in their midst. Whereas the atti-

tude toward the individual refugee is generally friendly and helpful, there is a hesitant feeling about refugees or other immigrants in the plural. Individuals are accepted, but the thought of an immigration movement provokes apprehension.

In general, refugees have been well received, and their coming has caused little concern. On the positive side, their special skills have been recognized as an asset to the nation and their contributions in many spheres appreciated. The record shows that they have not offered serious competition to Americans nor endangered their way of life. On the contrary, the indications are that they have had a beneficial influence upon this country out of proportion to their numbers.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In his classic treatise, **THE REFUGEE PROBLEM** (London, 1939), Sir John Hope Simpson has stated that the conditions in which final absorption of the refugees can occur are of a legal, political, economic, and cultural character, and that these conditions must be fulfilled in any country before its refugee problem is finally solved. Legal absorption of refugees, as of other immigrants, is symbolized by naturalization. The refugee, even though naturalized, is not, however, in a condition favorable to final absorption if he has not minimum political security or if he retains actively political external loyalties or the "refugee mentality"—a term applied to those who have preferred to remain unassimilated and have exploited their position as refugees for political purposes. Economically the refugee cannot achieve absorption without employment and security of livelihood. The right to work cannot be separated from the right of asylum. The final absorption of the refugee group involves the acquisition of the culture of the country of refuge and integration into its social life. Indispensable in this process is knowledge of the language of the country. Education of the children in the schools of the country, rather than in special schools established by immigrants for the purpose of retaining the language and culture of the parents, also is basic.

It may be stated quite literally that these conditions have been met to an extraordinary degree in America owing to the relatively small size of the problem, the selective quality of the immigrants, the remarkable absorptive power of the country, and the favorable traditions, institutions, and other characteristics of this greatest of all immigrant-receiving countries.

In many European countries, by way of contrast, the governments have largely failed to create those factors necessary to ensure conditions of complete absorption, while in their turn the refugees, particularly the older generation and certain irredentist nationalities, as a general rule have failed to adopt that attitude toward the country of refuge which would facilitate the emergence of those conditions. Many refugees in Europe have retained hopes of repatriation, and in some instances neither they nor the countries of refuge have regarded absorption as the desirable solution.

In the United States, on the other hand, with its long-established traditions as an immigrant-receiving country, the attitude toward refugees as toward other immigrants has been strongly in favor of absorption. The United States makes no legal differentiation between refugees and immigrants. The refugees have entered, as the country expected them to, with the intention of becoming Americans, and they have taken out their first citizenship papers at the earliest possible moment. There is no thought of return to the former homeland. The very geographic location of the country, involving a land and sea voyage of several thousand miles, creates in the refugee embarking for America a feeling of divorce from the past. This attitude is strengthened by his being admitted for permanent residence. Wherever he settles he finds incentives, even pressures, on all sides to become assimilated. No region has been settled by any one nationality, there are no permanent minority groups with special legislation defining their rights, immigrants are treated as individuals rather than members of a nationality group, and the way is open to all to become full-fledged American citizens. Under these circumstances, no spe-

cifically refugee problem exists in the United States; there is simply the immigrant problem, a problem which has existed throughout our entire history and which has been solved in each generation with good judgment and justice, to the development and enrichment of American society.

RECENT TRENDS OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

CONRAD TAEUBER¹

THE increases in the farm population during 1945 and 1946 are the first such increases since 1932. They follow a series of years during which the net losses in the farm population had been extraordinarily large. By 1945, the farm population had declined to 25.2 million persons, from 30.3 million in 1940 and the depression high of 32.0 million in 1933. But although there was an increase of 1,260,000 between April, 1944, and April, 1946, the farm population in April, 1946, was 11 per cent less than in 1940, and smaller than it had been at any time during the fifty years prior to 1944.

Losses in the farm population in the past have been due to migration from farms. During the twenty-five years between January 1, 1920, and January 1, 1945, there was an average net migration from farms of 600,000 civilians per year. Even during the 1930's, the average annual net migration from farms was approximately 375,000. However, because the excess of births over deaths was relatively large, the net losses were much less than the losses through migration, with the result that the farm population in 1940 was only approximately 4 per cent less than in 1920.

The increase in farm population during 1945 is primarily an adjustment from the large out-migration of the war years. The increase resulted from the return of some 452,000 men, net, from the armed forces and an excess of births over deaths amounting to 348,000. More than a million civilians moved to farms from nonfarm areas, but that number was balanced by an equivalent number of moves from farms to nonfarm areas. A balancing of these two population movements in any one year is in itself unusual. No doubt it is a result of the rapid industrial reconversion and demobilization of the military forces in the latter part of 1945. The same factors are operating dur-

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ing 1946; and the increase in farm population during the first half of this year is greater than the normal seasonal increase.

Though the extent and duration of this readjustment are not readily discernible, it appears likely that the size of the farm population of this country by 1950 will be considerably below the level of 1940 or the preceding years. Characterizing the recent increases in farm population as an adjustment to the unusually large migrations from farms during the war years rests on the assumption that the long-time trend of migration from farms and reductions in the farm population has not yet run its course. This in turn rests on the further assumption that there will continue to be ample employment opportunities for those individuals who leave the farms in the future. Unless such opportunities continue to exist, there may be a repetition of the development of the 1930's when there was a large-scale reduction in migration away from farms, some migration to farms, particularly in the poor land areas, and extensive under-employment and unemployment on farms.

If employment opportunities in agriculture continue to shrink, but farm residents continue to maintain a relatively high level of fertility, opportunities in nonagricultural employment are a necessary outlet for the farm population. Conversely, if nonagricultural employment opportunities continue to expand, migration from farms will continue to be necessary to provide urban workers.

In the past, the farm population has had a higher level of fertility than the nonfarm population; the Census of 1940 showed that the fertility ratio in the farm population was 63 per cent greater than that of the nonfarm population. Since that time the fertility of nonfarm women has increased much more rapidly than that of the farm women. Nonetheless, estimates of fertility ratios in October, 1945, indicated that the ratio for the farm population was still nearly 50 per cent greater than that for the nonfarm population.² For both groups the

² These comparisons are based on ratios of children under 5 per 1,000 women 14-44, because no other age break-down for women in October, 1945 was available.

fertility ratios in October, 1945, were slightly greater than those in 1930. The fertility ratio of the farm population had declined by 10.5 per cent between 1930 and 1940, while that of the non-farm population declined by 16.8 per cent during the same period. The increases between 1940 and 1945 were not identical; that for the farm population was 14.1 per cent, while that for the nonfarm population was twice as great, 28.7 per cent. The fertility of the farm population has changed less rapidly, either increasing or decreasing, than that of the nonfarm population. The reported changes are consistent with the view that before 1940 the fertility of the farm population was less subject to control than that of the nonfarm population, and that the present temporary situation will be followed by more rapid declines in nonfarm than in farm fertility. It appears unlikely that the differential between these two will soon disappear, or that in the near future the farm population will not continue to have more children than are needed for replacement of that population.

Though fertility in the farm population is considerably higher than in the nonfarm population, the numerical and proportionate contribution of the farm population to the total population is declining. The farm population now includes only about one-fifth of the total. Even though that fifth contributes more than its proportion of births, there is little basis for concluding that the maintenance of a high level of fertility in the farm population could or would be sufficient to maintain the national population if the nonfarm population should fail to maintain itself. If the farm population should become still smaller than it is at the present time, its contribution will probably also become smaller than it is at present.

Because entry into the labor market and changes of residence normally occur in young adulthood, it is useful to examine the effects of the higher levels of fertility on these age groups. In the farm population there is normally a larger number of young people reaching maturity than there are older persons dying or retiring and thus creating vacancies in the labor force. As of

1940, the situation was such that, assuming no migration during the succeeding decade, the number of young male adults available to replace older men who would die or reach retirement age during that time was 67 per cent greater than was needed for replacement. In other words, two out of every five young men who would reach their 25th birthday during the decade would not be needed to keep the number of 25-69-year-old men at the 1940 level. If some decrease in the number of older men occurs due to migration, the excess of younger men is correspondingly increased.

That condition did not exist uniformly throughout the country. The replacement ratios varied widely from State to State, from a low of 100 in New Hampshire to a high of 217 in Utah and North Carolina. It existed to a greater or lesser degree in all parts of the country and was least marked in the more productive agricultural areas, most pronounced in the less productive areas.

In 1940, the replacement rate for adult males in the farm population was 9 per cent greater than in the rural nonfarm population and 64 per cent greater than in the urban population.

Actually, the wartime migrations were so numerous that by 1945 the replacement rate for males of working age in the rural farm population had dropped to 100; i.e., without further migration to and from farms, the number of men reaching age 25 between 1945 and 1955 would be approximately equal to the number of older men who would die or reach retirement age. This unusual condition results from the very large migration of young men to the Armed Forces and to nonfarm jobs, for in effect there has been an advance drawing on the number of young men who might have been available for migration during the ten years following 1945. This temporary condition is being altered rapidly. As men return from the Armed Forces and as the smaller cohort of young adult men is replaced by the teenage group, which was too young to be involved in the wartime migrations, there will again be more young farm men reaching

adulthood than are needed to replace older men who die or retire.

The extensive wartime migrations followed a decade during which migration from farms had gone on at a reduced rate, with the result that by 1940 there was on farms a large reservoir of manpower above the numbers needed to maintain or to increase agricultural production. One indication of this is the fact that although the total farm population in 1940 was about the same as it had been in 1930, a significant change in age composition had occurred during that decade. The number of persons under 14 years of age decreased by approximately a million persons, while the number who were 14 years old or over increased by the same amount. The increase in the number of persons of working age was not based on an expanding need for agricultural workers, but primarily on the lack of alternative opportunities. The increase during the 1930's in fact had occurred in spite of the growing use of labor-saving technology and the tendency toward concentration of agricultural production in the best adapted areas which, along with other factors, had resulted in a reduction of manpower requirements.

The wartime demand for industrial workers and for members of the Armed Forces re-established and expanded the opportunities for migration from farms. Aside from some experimental attempts at shifting workers from less productive to more productive agricultural areas, some intensive job-training programs in remote rural areas, and some intensive efforts to publicize job opportunities in the more isolated rural areas, the movement to industrial and other jobs was largely without reference to manpower needs in agriculture. The more accessible areas, and those with better communication and educational facilities, were drawn on early for heavy contributions, but by the end of 1943 there was not a rural area in the country that had not felt the effects of large-scale population shifts. The policy of Selective Service was to defer men who were essential to agricultural production. Although this policy proved difficult to apply in a uniform manner under the system of local

determination which was used, the number of 14-24-year-old males in the rural farm population decreased by about one-fifth less than that in the rural nonfarm population.

Altogether there were about 11 million migrations from farms to cities, towns, and villages between 1940 and 1945, with 2 million of these by persons who went directly into the Armed Forces. There were 4 million moves to farms, and the natural increase of the farm population amounted to 2 million. The net result of the changes of the war period was a decline in the farm population from 30.3 million at the beginning of 1940 to 25.2 million at the beginning of 1945.

The greatest reduction in the farm population occurred in the West South Central States, which had also contributed heavily to the farm-nonfarm migration of the 1930's. In these States the farm population decreased by one-fourth between 1940 and 1945. Losses in that area had been occurring continually since 1933. In 1945, the farm population was only 70 per cent as large as in the peak year 1933. Losses were large throughout the South; for the entire region the decline in farm population between 1940 and 1945 amounted to 20 per cent.

A migration as large as that between 1940 and 1945 does not affect all segments of the population equally any more than it affects all areas equally. The wartime migration of men exceeded that of women, though the reverse was generally true before the war. The fact that nearly all of the persons entering the Armed Forces were men was obviously a factor in bringing about this unusual sex ratio among the migrants, but even if all of the persons who went from farms directly to the Armed Forces are left out of account, the remaining migrants still include more men than women.

The persons who were between 20 and 24 years old in April, 1944, had contributed proportionately more migrants than any other age group. This contribution can be readily expressed as a percentage of the persons in that age group who would have been present on farms had there been no migration; i.e., the survivors of persons who were 16-20 years old in April, 1940.

Fifty-four per cent of them were lost to the farm population through migration—66 per cent among men and 40 per cent among women. Among the next younger group, those 14–19 years old, in 1944, approximately 25 per cent had been lost to the farm population by migration, with the ratio slightly higher for males and slightly lower for females. And among persons 25–44 years old, 29 per cent of the men and 12 per cent of the women were lost through migration, including entrants into the Armed Forces. The shift was so marked that, whereas, in 1940, 64 per cent of all males 14 years old and over were under 45, in 1944, this percentage had decreased to 56 per cent. As part of the current readjustment, some of the younger men who left during the war years have returned since April, 1944, and others will no doubt return during the next years, so that the next Census may be expected to show an age distribution somewhat nearer normal than that of 1944.

The large volume of migration from farms during 1940–1945 was accompanied, as in normal periods, by migration in the opposite direction. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics estimates that during those five years there were approximately 11 million migrations from farms and 4 million to farms; together amounting to a gross total more than twice as great as the net loss of 7 million. A similar result was secured by the Bureau of the Census from a recent survey of the civilian population which reported movement to and from farms between December, 1941, and March, 1945. Nearly 5.5 million persons reported a nonfarm residence in March, 1945, but a farm residence at the time of Pearl Harbor. Conversely, 2.5 million reported residence on a farm in 1945, but not on a farm at the time of Pearl Harbor. The gross total of 8.0 million is nearly two and one-half times as great as the net loss by that measure. These two methods deal with entirely different concepts of migration and the absolute figures which result are not comparable. Nonetheless the two reports agree in showing that even in a period in which there was a large net movement away from farms, there was also a considerable movement to and from farms.

How much of the movement to farms that has already occurred will be permanent cannot be foreseen at present, for considerable shifts in population as part of the adjustment process are still to be expected. Widespread housing shortages in cities may have led considerable numbers of persons to seek available residences on farms until housing becomes more readily available in their urban places of employment.

Some indications of future developments can be secured from the postwar intentions of soldiers who had come from farms. A survey by the Army indicated that out-migration from the highly developed agricultural areas of the West North Central States and from the Southern States probably would be heavy. Another survey of white enlisted men in the Army found that nearly two-thirds of the men with farm experience who left farms to enter the Armed Forces planned to return to full-time farming, but that only 9 per cent of the young farm men who had entered some other occupation prior to their induction into the Armed Forces definitely planned to return to farming after the war. Late in the summer of 1946 approximately 1 million veterans of World War II were working on farms. This is more than two-thirds as many as the number of farm workers who had entered the Armed Forces before the war ended. Current estimates of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics indicate that veterans are going to farms in the Far Western States in greater numbers than would be the case if the movement were in proportion to the areas from which they came before joining the Armed Forces and that they were going to farms in the North and South Central areas in less than proportionate numbers. But civilians are not returning to farms in such volume. Recent estimates indicate that by mid-1946 the migrants to farms were predominantly persons who had not lived on farms immediately before the outbreak of the war.

In any attempt to visualize the future course of the farm population it is necessary to distinguish between residence on farms and residence in rural areas. The trend toward suburban and country living by urban workers is expected to continue

and may be accelerated as transportation again becomes readily available. To an increasing degree there are included among the people living on farms individuals who have little or no relation to the operation of the farm or the performance of the work on the farm. Personal preference, convenience, cost, hedging against a depression, and many other factors may make a farm appear to be a desirable place of residence for persons whose major occupation is not in agriculture. There have been strong and insistent voices calling for decentralization of industry and of residential areas, and extolling the advantages of producing at least a portion of the family's food requirements through part-time farming. Although there has been an increase in the number of families who secure their livelihood through a combination of agricultural and nonagricultural activities, further increases in the numbers of these families are likely to be slow. Surveys of home food production have indicated a lessening of that activity after the war, and past experience would indicate that many persons are unwilling or unable to meet the requirements of continuous part-time farming when food supplies are generally adequate and employment and wage levels are high.

Although not all agricultural workers live on farms, and many farm residents do not work in agriculture, even in 1944, nine out of ten agricultural workers lived in a household which included a farm operator or a household whose head was engaged in a farm occupation. In the main, therefore, the assumption of a relationship between agricultural production and the size of the farm population appears to be valid. In those terms the present outlook is for a smaller farm population in the future than during the prewar years. A recent analysis of future production and labor requirements, made in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, attempted to make full allowance for increased food demands likely to result from full employment; it took into account a cautious evaluation of the prospects for export markets, and the development of farm technology, including the cotton picker; and gave recognition to the inhibitions to movement of unneeded and underemployed farm work-

ers. Even with such qualifications, the conclusion was that by 1950 the number of workers needed in agriculture would be below the low levels reached during the war years.

The major developments leading to this conclusion are those which have occurred in the recent application of farm technology. The record of the war years is generally known; agricultural production during 1945 was approximately 32 per cent greater than in 1935-1939, though the annual average number of farm workers was 10 per cent less. But this is not only a wartime development. Agricultural production during 1945 was 59 per cent greater and the average number of farm workers was 20 per cent less than during the years 1910-1914. Even in 1940-1945 the United States was not fully utilizing all of the potentially available technology in its agriculture, and it is therefore inconceivable that the high levels of productivity of agricultural workers which were achieved during the war years will not be exceeded in the near future. Shortages of machinery and fertilizers in many areas slowed down production in recent years; significant wartime developments in the types and methods of application of pesticides will soon be widely used; inability to secure all of the desired labor during the war induced developments in the use of power, methods of cultivation, and rationalization in the use of labor and in the marketing of farm products which will no doubt continue. Moreover, in many fields there was an acceleration of scientific and technological development.

There are also some major developments which tend to operate in the opposite direction. No doubt the relaxation in the long hours worked by farm workers, which is already noticeable, will continue, and there will be less reliance upon women and children for agricultural work than there was during the war years. Because of the war some retirements were postponed, and current levels of prices of farm products and of farm real estate will stimulate the replacement of over-age farm workers by younger persons. On the whole, however, the anticipated replacements are not likely to be on a "one for one" basis. The

workers who are being displaced are generally the older or physically weaker persons—the persons entering the working force are largely men in the most active ages.

The large-scale shifts in diet during the last generation have involved increased consumption of agricultural products which require more intensive applications of human labor. Mechanization and other labor-saving developments have been less rapid in fruit and vegetable production, and in the production of dairy and poultry products than in the production of grain. Increased demand for such products would require proportionately greater increases in the labor used than a corresponding increase in the demand for cereals, but labor-saving technology in these fields will no doubt be rapidly developed.

In view of the future developments that appear to be clearly foreseeable, it seems unlikely that the farm population of the future will be as large a number or a percentage of the total population as it was in 1940, if ample nonfarm employment opportunities exist. A severe depression probably would again increase the farm population, especially in the areas least adapted to commercial agriculture. But an increase under such conditions would be a symptom of social and economic maladjustments and would require treatment as such.

With respect to agriculture the manpower problem is more largely one of distribution and utilization than of the total number of workers. In a social and economic order that provides adequate employment opportunities for all of its workers, the issues in rural-urban migration become those of securing optimum occupational adjustments for the individual workers. This assumes fluidity of the labor force. For the areas of net out-migration, a major concern would be with measures to reduce or prevent the detrimental effects of a continued out-migration of the most capable individuals; for the areas of in-migration, a major concern would be with reduction or prevention of the adjustment problems which arise when many persons from one cultural setting must adjust to another.

ANNOTATIONS

WOMEN IN INDUSTRY¹

THE number of women gainfully employed in the United States had steadily increased prior to the War and in 1940 approximately twelve million women were employed. The demand for labor during the War brought additional millions of women into industry and the total gainfully employed reached eighteen million. Many of these women had had no work experience and many performed types of work which previously were considered only suitable for men. Under these circumstances, the efficient use of this new labor force and the health problems associated with the employment of women demanded serious attention. To meet this demand, Dr. Anna M. Baetjer prepared for the Army Industrial Hygiene Laboratory a report on WOMEN IN INDUSTRY. Although prepared specifically to meet a war need, the problems of women in industry do not cease with the War. It is estimated that more than sixteen million women will be gainfully employed by 1950 and it is to be hoped that interest will continue in studying and applying the ways and means for utilizing this labor efficiently and in improving our understanding of the health and social problems associated with the employment of women.

WOMEN IN INDUSTRY is a review and analysis of available information on the subject. In the author's words, "An effort has been made to present the scientific facts which are known concerning the health and efficiency of women in relation to their employment, to summarize the information gained during the war, and to indicate those phases of the problem which

¹ Baetjer, Anna M.: WOMEN IN INDUSTRY, Their Health and Efficiency. Issued under the Auspices of the Division of Medical Sciences and the Division of Engineering and Industrial Research of the National Research Council. W. B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia and London, 1946, 344 pp. \$4.00.

need further investigation." A wealth of data has been assembled bearing on such subjects as: the physique of women; types of work and conditions of work suitable for them; sick-absenteeism of women as compared with men; accidental injuries and occupational diseases among women; gynecological and obstetrical problems associated with the employment of women; the relation of industrial work to menstruation, the menopause and other gynecological conditions; mortality of women in relation to occupation; and fertility of employed women. Data are not merely presented but are critically evaluated so that their limitations are made clear. On some questions, such as the relative susceptibility of women and men to occupational diseases, the relative frequency of accidents under similar conditions, and the effect of different types of work on the health of women, Dr. Baetjer finds that evidence is lacking or inconclusive. The careful evaluation of the data adds much to the value of this report.

Experience has shown that to obtain maximum health and efficiency of women in industry attention should be given to a number of special problems. These relate chiefly to proper selection and adequate training of women for a particular job, adjustment of machines, etc. to the size and strength of women, hours and conditions of work, and consideration of individual problems by the personnel and medical services. Recommendations for dealing with these problems are discussed fully. For the most part, however, conditions which are conducive to efficient work and a minimum number of accidents and sick-absences by men are also satisfactory for women.

DOROTHY G. WIEHL

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BCG VACCINATION AGAINST TUBERCULOSIS

STUDIES of the protective effect of the BCG vaccine against tuberculosis have been made with varying methods and varying results since the work was initiated by Calmette in France. Tuberculin-negative infants and children have been inoculated with the bacillus of Calmette and Guerin (BCG), an attenuated strain of the bovine type of tubercle, under the

theory that the infection introduced by the vaccination would build up a resistance to virulent strains of tubercle bacilli. There has been an insufficient amount of experimental data to evaluate the effectiveness of BCG vaccination, but two recent reports of studies being carried on in the United States, a third from Canada, and a fourth on the use of the vaccine in Denmark afford valuable evidence on the subject.

Aronson and Palmer¹ have published a report covering the first six years' results of the use of BCG vaccine among a group of North American Indians living in various communities in the Western part of the United States and in southeastern Alaska. The sample population consisted of 3,007 Indian children and young adults aged 1-20 who failed to react to a dose (0.005 mg.) of standardized tuberculin PPD. "A random portion of the negative reactors was vaccinated intracutaneously with freshly prepared BCG vaccine while the remainder served as controls." The control group was given 0.1 cc. sterile physiological salt solution. The tuberculin tests and vaccinations were begun in December, 1935, and were completed in February, 1938. Comparable follow-up examinations consisting of chest X-rays, tuberculin tests, and histories of exposure to tuberculosis were given to the experimental and to the control group.

Striking differences were found between the vaccinated and the unvaccinated in respect to total mortality, mortality from tuberculosis, and tuberculosis morbidity. The total death rate per 1,000 person-years of experience was 3.8 in the BCG group as compared with 7.2 in the control group. The deaths from tuberculosis numbered twenty-eight for the 1,457 persons in the control group and four for the 1,550 persons in the BCG group. When the cases of tuberculosis were subdivided according to stage and type, the results were more favorable for the BCG group than for the control group for every diagnostic category. During the six years the total annual incidence of cases remained relatively constant for the control group; that for the BCG group declined progressively in successive years after vaccination.

¹ Aronson, Joseph D. and Palmer, Carroll E.: Experience With BCG Vaccine in the Control of Tuberculosis Among North American Indians. *Public Health Reports*, United States Public Health Service, June 7, 1946, 61, No. 23, pp. 802-820.

Attack rates decreased with increasing age in the BCG group but showed relatively little difference with age in the control group.

An analysis of the separate localities represented in the study showed a reduction in the incidence of cases for every Indian reservation, although the amount of the reduction varied somewhat between reservations. Some of the variation was believed to have resulted from differences in the lots of vaccine used. At the reservation where the reduction was least, however, the incidence of cases was twice as great in the control group as in the vaccinated group.

From Canada, Ferguson² reports marked decreases in the incidence of tuberculosis among nurses and attendants of general hospitals and sanatoria following the use of BCG vaccination. Comparisons were made between the vaccinated during a five-year period, 1939-1943, and the unvaccinated during the previous five-year period, 1934-1938.

A study of all nurses entering training in eight Saskatchewan general hospitals revealed a 25 per cent lower incidence of tuberculosis among the 1,005 vaccinated negative reactors than among 759 unvaccinated tuberculin-negative nurses in the earlier period. The incidence of tuberculosis among the BCG group was also found to be significantly lower than that among unvaccinated tuberculin-negative nurses in the Winnipeg General Hospital during the period 1934-1943. The new tuberculosis cases which developed in the general hospitals were distributed throughout the greater part of the nurses' training period.

A group of nurses, hospital attendants, and other employes exposed to tuberculosis in sanatoria were given BCG vaccine. In contrast to the general hospitals where the average percentage of nonvaccinated negative nurses becoming positive to tuberculin in the first year of training was 12 per year, the percentage of nonvaccinated tuberculin-negative employes who became positive to tuberculin during the first year of exposure in the sanatoria was 60. The findings, even in this area of high infection, were decidedly in favor of BCG. The incidence of

² Ferguson, R. G.: BCG Vaccination in Hospitals and Sanatoria of Saskatchewan. *Canadian Journal of Public Health*, November, 1946, 37, No. 11, pp. 435-451.

tuberculous cases was reduced one-fifth among the vaccinated in the sanatoria as compared with the unvaccinated during the preceding period. Most of the new tuberculosis cases occurring in the sanatoria developed in the early months of employment.

The experience of the graduate nurses and nurses' assistants in the sanatoria was studied separately because of the excessive risk to which this group was subjected. The percentage of unvaccinated tuberculin-negative nurses who became positive to tuberculin after one year's exposure was 71.8. During a period of slightly more than one year 2.46 per cent of the 203 vaccinated nurses developed manifest tuberculosis; 15.9 per cent of the 113 nonvaccinated negative nurses developed tuberculosis. Since vaccination of tuberculin-negative nurses was begun in September, 1938, the serious situation with regard to the excessive incidence of tuberculosis among nurses and sanatoria employees no longer exists in Saskatchewan.

In contrast to these positive findings for BCG vaccine as a protective measure against tuberculosis, Levine and Sackett³ found no reduction in tuberculosis mortality during the first five years of life among a group of BCG vaccinated infants from tuberculous homes in New York City as compared with a similar control group. The only criterion used for determining the effectiveness of vaccination in this study was tuberculosis mortality.

The New York City sample population consisted of children, almost entirely under age 1, from tuberculous families referred from tuberculosis clinics and hospitals. Those aged 1 month and over must have been negative to 1.0 mg. tuberculin and must have had negative chest X-rays and negative physical examinations.

The study was divided into two periods: (1) 1927-January 1, 1933, when the selection of children to be vaccinated was made by the physician; and (2) January 1, 1933-January 1, 1944, when alternate children were routinely vaccinated. Prior to the change in method, the tendency was to vaccinate the children of the more intelligent and more cooperative parents.

³ Levine, Milton I. and Sackett, Margaret F.: Results of BCG Immunization in New York City. *The American Review of Tuberculosis*, June, 1946, LII, No. 6, pp. 517-532.

In the earlier period, 0.68 per cent of the 445 vaccinated children died of tuberculosis as compared with 3.38 per cent of the control children. In the later period, 1.41 per cent of the 566 children in the BCG group and 1.51 per cent of the 528 children in the control group died of tuberculosis.

To try to explain the change in the mortality rates in the second period the authors examined the following factors:

1. Exposure to positive sputum cases
2. Racial distribution
3. Economic conditions
4. Proportion of lost cases
5. Number of autopsies performed
6. Variations in the activity of the BCG vaccine

No important differences between the two groups with respect to any of the above variables were found.

The only factor which the authors could find to explain the shift in mortality was the weighting of the earlier control group with children of uncooperative parents. As criteria of the degree of cooperation of the family, (1) the average number of clinic visits made during the first year, and (2) a rating by the visiting nurses as to the type of care received by the child were compared for the vaccinated cases and the controls in each period. The two groups differed markedly before January 1, 1933, and were relatively similar after that date in regard both to the average number of visits and the nurses' rating. No information was given as to what "type of care" included. It would have been desirable to describe briefly the criteria used in rating the families.

The question as to whether or not the deaths among the BCG vaccinated children result from a tuberculous infection received prior to vaccination or to a massive infection before the effects of the vaccine could exert itself, arises in any study of this kind. Levine and Sackett attempted to study the problem by comparing the tuberculous mortality for a special group of vaccinated cases with a similar control group, both of whom had been separated from their homes for three months before and three months after vaccination. They concluded that, although such separation was impractical and inadvisable, the inoculation

might be of some protection if the children could be separated from exposure to tuberculosis for a sufficient period of time before and after vaccination.

The writers finally conclude that "as a public health measure the routine vaccination with BCG of children from tuberculous homes is probably of less advantage than removing the tuberculous case from the home."

It is evident that more data needs to be accumulated, particularly with reference to the importance of age in vaccination and to duration of the resistance. The study among the Indians suggested that vaccination was more effective in older than in younger children and that protection might be greater in the later than in the earlier years after vaccination.

More data on the changes in the tuberculin reactions would be of interest. Among the unvaccinated negative reactors the proportion becoming positive after exposure to tuberculosis furnishes an index to the infectivity of the environment. The vaccination induces a positive reaction to tuberculin in the great majority of persons. It would be of interest, however, to know what proportion of persons continue to give a positive reaction to tuberculin in successive periods after vaccination.

The study of Aronson and Palmer and that of Ferguson both suggest that BCG vaccination may have definite value in areas of high infection. The results indicate that the protection given by BCG is considerable although not absolute; cases of pulmonary tuberculosis do occur among the BCG vaccinated. The New York City study still leaves room for further analysis of the problem, since the study was limited to persons vaccinated in infancy and followed only for the first five years of life. It has been demonstrated that the vaccination has advantages for certain populations unavoidably exposed to tuberculosis.

Although emphasis has been placed on the use of BCG for areas of high infection, in Denmark it has been employed particularly for populations in areas of low infection. BCG vaccination has been used extensively in Denmark since 1940 according to Holm.⁴ Denmark has a large number of tuberculin-negative young adults. Approximately two-thirds of the population

⁴ Holm, Johannes: BCG Vaccination in Denmark. *Public Health Reports*, United States Public Health Service, September 6, 1946, 61, No. 36, pp. 1298-1323.

at age 14 are negative reactors and at ages 20-23 one-third still give a negative reaction to tuberculin. The amount of infection in the population as measured by the tuberculin test varies in different localities of Denmark and is dependent largely on the amount of infection in the cattle. The negative reactors have been found to be at special risk of developing severe cases of primary infection in adult life and also to be at greater risk than are the positive reactors of developing reinfection tuberculosis subsequently. BCG is used extensively and very successfully in Denmark to prevent these dangerous primary infections in adults.

Experience in Denmark has indicated that BCG also helps to prevent the development of reinfection pulmonary tuberculosis, although according to Holm the protection given is not absolute. Holm cites figures for the Island of Bornholm, a low-infection area, showing that the new cases of pulmonary tuberculosis were substantially reduced after vaccination as compared with a prior period. Among students at the University of Copenhagen a greater incidence of tuberculosis cases was noted among students who had been negative to tuberculin than among the positive reactors; no cases were noted in the BCG vaccinated group. An epidemic of tuberculous infection which occurred in a State School in 1942 was also cited to demonstrate the effectiveness of BCG vaccination.

The report on BCG in Denmark is not the analysis of one particular study but a brief review of the history of the use of BCG in that country and an outline of the policies in practice there today. Special attention is paid to the variations found in the virulence of the BCG strain, the preparation of the vaccine, and the complications occurring in vaccination. In Denmark a person must have been free from exposure to tuberculosis six weeks before the vaccination is performed. Children from tuberculous families who have been vaccinated are not permitted to associate with the source of infection at home until after they show a positive reaction. The details as to how the separation of these children from their homes is accomplished in Denmark are not given in this report.

The duration of the protection induced by the vaccination is considered in Denmark to coincide with the duration of the

positive tuberculin reaction. In that country, tuberculin testing is carried out extensively and uniformly. In recent years, BCG vaccination was applied to all tuberculin-negative soldiers in the Danish Army. The tendency now is to vaccinate all tuberculin-negative school children. In Denmark, BCG vaccination has apparently been accepted widely as a public health measure in tuberculosis prevention.

The data reported upon here indicate that BCG vaccination may be a valuable adjunct to other protective measures in tuberculosis work, especially for certain population groups. Also indicated is the need for continued research and for careful observation and evaluation of any BCG vaccination program.

SALLY PREAS

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INDIA'S POPULATION: FACT AND POLICY¹

IN our troubled world no people are more tragically ravaged by poverty, famine, and disease than are those of India. It is of these people that Dr. Chandrasekhar writes in his book **INDIA'S POPULATION: FACT AND POLICY**. The author introduces India's population problem as an example of too many births, too many deaths, and too many people subsisting at shockingly low levels of living. He focuses attention upon the underlying economic and social maladjustments of his native country, and offers a nontechnical description for the general reader.

The mean density of population for all India is not abnormal. Although parts of east Bengal have over 1,000 persons per square mile, India as a whole has a mean density of only 246 persons per square mile. This is five and one-half times the density of our United States but it is less than that of Germany, Japan, or England. The rate of growth of India's population likewise is not abnormal, but because of her giant population a modest 15 per cent rate of increase during 1931-1941 added fifty millions to her numbers within that time (p. 16).

The steady rate of growth and high birth rate of India during the last two decades are the results of social, religious, economic,

¹ Chandrasekhar, S.: **INDIA'S POPULATION: FACT AND POLICY**. New York, The John Day Company, 1946, 117 pp. \$2.00.

and political factors. Relative peace has been India's during this span of years and some improvements have been made in her health measures and agricultural techniques. Thus, whereas death rates have declined slightly, birth rates remain high owing to the universality of the married state, the early age at which reproduction begins, and the virtual absence of practices of family limitation.

India's population is largely rural and agrarian. She has fifty-seven cities with a population of 100,000 or more, and there is not much rural-urban migration. With no alternative to the agricultural way of life the peasants are economically tied to the land on which they were born. Furthermore, caste and differences in languages and customs discourage migration even from one province to another. The proportion of industrial workers to the total working population has even declined, and 85 to 90 per cent of the population still depend upon the land either indirectly or directly for their livelihood (p. 52).

The majority of India's rural families live in mud huts. Frequently there is only one room for a large family. In the cities there is sharp contrast between luxury and poverty. Sanitary facilities and an adequate water supply frequently are lacking in the workers' quarters, and over-crowding in these areas was intensified during the war.

India's literacy record is shockingly low; only 12 per cent of the people ten years of age and over were literate in 1941. The percentage is lower for females than for males.

Public health facilities are woefully inadequate both in personnel and equipment. On the average, one doctor must serve a population of 10,000, two hospital beds must serve 10,000, and one nurse must serve 100,000 (p. 58). In 1940 there were barely 2,000 dentists in all India (p. 58). The life expectancy in India is thirty-two as compared with our own expectancy of sixty-one years. Enormous resources of human life are wasted by malaria, tuberculosis, and the epidemics—cholera, plague, smallpox.

The formulation of a wholesome population policy for India is no easy task. The author suggests as a first step the creation of a National Census Bureau, and the appointment of a Population Commission composed of leading sociologists, economists, medical authorities, social workers, and statisticians who would

study both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the problem. He claims that the government concentrates on maintaining law and order and gives too little attention to the education, health, and land resources. As further concrete proposals, Chandrasekhar advocates the establishment of a "Ministry of Public Affairs" with four bureaus. (1) A "Bureau of Marriage and Eugenics" might promote a uniform marriage law with an effective ban on early marriage. It could foster premarital medical examinations, prenatal and postnatal care for mothers, and the provision of birth control facilities. (2) A "Bureau of Growth and Nutrition" could try to devise a balanced diet within the means of the average Indian. It could seek to remove religious and social bans on certain foods, and cooperate with agriculturists in attempts at improving the national food supply. (3) A "Bureau of Education and Vocational Guidance" could work for universal compulsory education. (4) A "Bureau of Special Clinics" might establish more adequate facilities to combat tuberculosis, leprosy, and mental diseases. It should emphasize research and develop a well-trained personnel.

Obviously, such a program would require tremendous financial backing by the government and India's poverty is at the heart of her population problem. One cannot plan a Utopia when bare subsistence can hardly be maintained. Chandrasekhar sees hope in national socialism with government-controlled heavy industries and landlordism abolished in agriculture. He would have land redistributed and cooperative farming encouraged. He feels that India could only achieve economic reorganization with political independence. Chandrasekhar does not attempt to tell us how such elaborate social and economic planning is to be accomplished. But he has performed well the task of introducing the reader to the problems of his native India.

RUTH DORIS HENZE

